NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Volume 87 | Number 1

Article 2

12-1-2008

The SEC's Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic
Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest
Lawrence A. Cunningham

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Lawrence A. Cunningham, The SEC's Global Accounting Vision: A Realistic Appraisal of a Quixotic Quest, 87 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (2008).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.unc.edu/nclr/vol87/iss1/2

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Law Review by an authorized administrator of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact law_repository@unc.edu.

THE SEC'S GLOBAL ACCOUNTING VISION:
A REALISTIC APPRAISAL OF A QUIXOTIC
QUEST*
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM**
In the most revolutionary securities law development since the
New Deal, the SEC is poised to jettison rules requiring
companies to apply recognized U.S. accounting standards by
inviting use of a new set of internationalstandards created by a
private London-based organization. This radical shift follows
decades of gradual movement toward international standards
that has gained momentum since 2005 when all listed companies
in the European Union were required to use them. For the
United States, the SEC could give companies the option to use
either, or establish a medium-term plan to move U.S. companies
to internationalstandards within a decade.
Analysis of the SEC's vision for this quest reveals that it contains
contradictions, paradoxes, and ironies that suggest quixotic
thinking. A contradiction: the SEC touts its vision as promoting
comparability,yet proposes injecting choice and competition into
accounting standards that would reduce it. A paradox: the SEC
celebrates a single set of global standards while advocating
changes that would create a double set within the United States,
and it overlooks factors that justify skepticism about the
possibility of a single set of written standards translating into
uniform application. An irony: the SEC acknowledges that
pursuingglobal standardsis "very complex," while its Chairman
says the SEC has "declared a war on complexity" in accounting.
A more realistic vision of the quest appreciatesthat, under either
an optional or mandatory route, the shift amounts to a leap of
faith posing both large costs for the United States and potentially
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large gains for it and the world. This realistic appraisallowers
expectations about actual comparability, highlights serious risks
that competing standards would impair comparability,
recognizes needs the SEC has scantly examined to render
elaborate infrastructural changes, and, above all, faces the
realization that the abrupt shift is less about the SEC's historical
mandate to protect investors than about a newly undertaken
mission to expand global capitalism.***
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INTRODUCTION

This Article probes the most revolutionary development in
securities regulation since the New Deal:
the Securities and
Exchange Commission's willingness to jettison rules requiring
companies to apply recognized U.S. accounting standards by inviting
use of a new set of international standards created by a private
London-based organization.1 The SEC believes such action benefits
investors, at least as a matter of lip service.
It suggests that
competition among international and domestic standards is desirable,
says that adopting international standards will result in greater
comparability, and imagines playing little more than a coordinating
function among peer agencies in other countries.
Critical analysis of this vision indicates that the quest may be
quixotic-an idealistic view with limited regard to practicality. First,
1. See SEC Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers To Prepare Financial
Statements in Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards, Securities
Act Release No. 8831, Exchange Act Release No. 56,217, Investment Company Act
Release No. 27,924, 72 Fed. Reg. 45,600, 45,607 (Aug. 7, 2007) [hereinafter SEC Concept
Release on Domestic IFRS] ("The U.S. public capital market has experienced neither the
wide co-existence of financial statements prepared under two sets of accounting standards,
nor a change of a group of U.S. issuers from reporting under one set of accounting
standards to another.").
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competition among accounting standards is inconsistent with
comparability in financial reporting. Second, even were a single set of
standards to emerge from either a competitive or standardization
process, this would not necessarily increase net comparability: it
could increase comparability among companies based in different
geographic locations but reduce comparability within given countries,
including the United States. Third, any shift requires profound and
extensive changes to the United States and international
infrastructure that will be costly, create considerable dislocation, and
be extraordinarily complex, despite SEC rhetoric extolling the virtues
of financial reporting simplicity. Fourth, it is not obvious that the
transition benefits investors; they will bear significant costs for an
uncertain share of any gains from success.
This critique does not reject the aspirations driving the
momentous movement toward international accounting standards.
But it does ground them in the broader terrain of global capitalism
and provides a more realistic assessment of its prospects than does
the SEC. This alternative view interprets the quest for universal
accounting, strongly backed by the European Union, along with the
SEC, as a giant collective leap of faith to expand global capitalism. It
takes universal accounting as a pre-condition to global capitalism in
the twenty-first century, much as national capital accounting systems
were pre-conditions to the flourishing of capitalism in the eighteenth
and nineteenth centuries.2
This Article's investigation of the current status and pending
challenges yields cautious optimism that the requisite infrastructure,
at global and national levels, can be assembled to minimize costs and
maximize gains so that, on balance, the quest is achievable and
worthwhile. Throughout this analysis, attention to the expressed or
implied vision embraced by the SEC reveals a naive and sometimes
myopic position on innumerable complexities and challenges that the
SEC has faintly recognized and failed to address adequately. The
analysis supplies more realistic assessments of the principal challenges
and suggests ways to meet or cope with them.
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I assesses the immediate
situation by tracing the main themes driving the rise of global
accounting standards. Origins are found in capitalism's expansion,

2. See MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY 85-86 (Guenther Roth & Claus
Wittich eds., Ephraim Fischoff trans., Bedminster Press 1968) (exploring how the

development of capital accounting was a pre-condition to the flourishing of capitalism
during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries).
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fueled by contemporary Euro-American politics, and pressured by
transnational business enterprises. The SEC has long held an
institutional commitment to international standards, but its recent
lurch to embrace them is abrupt. It has provided limited public
analysis of many issues, including its authority to ordain international
standards. The SEC projects a quixotic quality to the current effort.
This impractical idealism may be attributable more to transitory
political imperatives than to traditional institutional commitments.
Additionally, the SEC's move creates a crossroads for U.S. capital
markets despite lack of preparedness and without examining many
domestic implications. These implications may be manageable and
must be faced, but they require more effort, patience, and risk than
the SEC's public analysis suggests.
Part II analyzes international substantive challenges posed by an
effort to replace the hundreds of national systems that have evolved
over generations with a single set of accounting standards. The SEC
likewise has given scant attention to national diversity, illustrated
here by using recognized subjects within the field of comparative
corporate law scholarship to show specific manifestations of their
effects on accounting. Substantive challenges arise from worldwide
variations in corporate finance, corporate governance, and securities
This diversity requires attention to matters of
regulation.
comparative investor protection, enforcement intensity, corporate
purpose, and the audiences that accounting reports target. To shift
from national to global standards requires transcending these
differences, a daunting challenge despite the SEC's reticence on the
issue.
Part III considers structural challenges, to which the SEC has
directed significant attention but with limited appreciation of their
enormity. These challenges include how to produce, interpret, and
enforce universal standards. The SEC's proposed model is based on
one developed in the United States and transplanted, at the SEC's
urging, for operation in London to address all the world's
That model succeeded in surmounting domestic
constituents.
administrative law challenges, but these challenges will multiply and
convolute on the global stage. Problems of delegation and agencyprincipal relationships that vexed U.S. participants for two
generations reappear as more complex. This discussion explores how
to coordinate national enforcement to promote global accounting
standards. It reviews the literature concerning why people comply
with law to assess the prospects that universal accounting standards
will be applied uniformly around the world.
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The conclusion absorbs these challenges and offers a broader
prognosis. Despite the SEC's pronouncements mentioning investor
interests and protection, the drive to international standards that the
SEC is pushing has little to do with investors. Instead, the movement
is a product of expanding capitalism and a way to reinforce its global
proliferation. Despite the SEC's reticence on many issues, the
transition is fraught with greater peril than the SEC acknowledges. It
is possible that accounting standards can transcend international
boundaries, as the metric system did globally for measurement in
recent centuries and the euro does regionally for currency today.3
But, contrary to SEC optimism, the journey is far from over, easy,
imminent, or certain.
A realistic assessment is tempered by
comprehending how the momentous challenges could doom the quest
for international accounting standards to the fate of Esperanto,4
except carrying significant costs in this case.
I. THE CURRENT STAGE
Migration from national accounting systems to a universal one is
propelled by the increasing existence of, and rising demand for, crossborder capital flows.
Cross-border capital flows make capital
allocation more efficient. By enticing more companies from various
countries into global capital markets, these cross-boarder capital
flows generate economic gains, thereby increasing national and global
wealth. This form of international engagement spreads capitalism as
an economic order which can, in turn, influence national interests and
behavior. As a general matter, the European Union and the United
States seek to spread capitalism as a matter of policy, especially to
China, Russia, and the developing world. Universal accounting
contributes to this objective by offering a common language to
conceive of economic production and wealth creation.
3. The metric system is followed worldwide, even in the United States; the euro is
adopted in nearly half the countries that are members of the European Union. Neither
system has transcended national boundaries absolutely, but they are among the most
impressive examples of relatively successful efforts. If international accounting achieved
similar standing, it could be considered successful.
4. Esperanto is a language invented with the hope of providing a single global
discourse that all people in the world would speak. It has never been adopted in any
country and is not known to be in wide use anywhere. For a discussion of Esperanto and
selected sources, see Thomas F. Blackwell, Finally Adding Method to Madness: Applying
Principles of Object-Oriented Analysis and Design to Legislative Drafting, 3 N.Y.U. J.
LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 227, 238 n.31 (2000); Vivian Grosswald Curran, Romantic Common
Law, Enlightened Civil Law: Legal Uniformity and the Homogenization of the European
Union, 7 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 63, 116-18 (2001); and Robert Huntington, Note, European
Unity and the Tower of Babel, 9 B.U. INT'L L.J. 321, 341-42 (1991).
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To achieve universal accounting requires nations to relinquish
traditional prerogatives of producing, interpreting, and enforcing
national standards according to local political, economic, and cultural
sensibilities. Such an achievement requires replicating each existing
national infrastructure at the global level and then inducing all
nations to assent to its legitimacy and defer to its operation. Many
costs may be incurred by a switch to universal accounting-both
direct and indirect. Direct costs of this exercise include establishing
global mechanisms and implementing national coordination. Indirect
costs of promoting a universal accounting system include the costs
attached to relinquishing sovereignty. Indirect costs of spreading
global capitalism are those that can accompany capitalism as an
economic order, including the increased ratio of rich to poor persons
in the world, the side-effects of industrialization such as excess carbon
emissions, and the angst of global cultural homogenization.'
A goal of any accounting standard is to treat like companies and
transactions alike and to treat different companies and different
transactions differently. The purpose of these treatments is to
provide comparability, meaning that users of financial statements can
readily compare the performance of alternative businesses. Thus,
promoting comparability is a purpose and effect of all national capital
accounting systems. Additionally, comparability is the cornerstone
for promoting efficient cross-border capital flows and allocation. It
requires that standards used to prepare statements are uniformly
written, interpreted, applied, and enforced. Essential to generating
gains is designing a global infrastructure that promotes comparability
of financial reports. Creating the capacity to promote comparability
under universal accounting is a formidable task.
To win acceptance amid global diversity, written standards must
be somewhat generic. In a best case scenario, the effect could be to
increase comparability of reporting between companies from vastly
different countries. However, given diversity in national business
practices and legal environments, comparability will not be complete.
The greater flexibility arising from more generic standards likely will
5. The term "globalization" is often used to refer to increasing cross-cultural
exchange and cross-border transactions. The term "global capitalism," used here, refers to
the unimpeded flow of capital, especially financial capital, across national borders. This
form of globalization is moving more rapidly than other forms, including cultural
globalization. Capitalists are defined by return maximization and are driven to move
capital to highest valuing uses, forging power to transcend borders. In comparison, local
cultural features evolve glacially. Yet global capitalism remains partially dependent on
cultural globalization. To the extent that accounting is a cultural product, providing
accounting that transcends cultural boundaries is both vital and difficult.
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lead in the future to less comparability between companies within any
given nation than exists today. The SEC's current vision has not
reflected the significance of this trade-off or these other stakes of the
quest, but appreciating this trade-off and the magnitude of the other
stakes is critical. Otherwise, the quest could backfire to promote
inefficient capital allocation and increase capital costs.
Section A of this Part identifies the main forces driving the
current situation as expanding capitalism, institutional SEC
commitment, and world economic and political conditions. The
review ultimately concludes that the SEC's current vision is an abrupt
lurch that requires explanation, apart from traditional institutional
support of international accounting standards. Further, matters of
political expediency, and a dose of personal ambition among the
SEC's leadership, seem to play a role in the current situation. Section
B presents and evaluates principal issues concerning the crossroads
that the SEC has created in the move to global accounting standards.
These issues pivot around embracing the SEC's vision, letting U.S.
issuers choose between international and U.S. standards, or setting a
mandatory switch. The discussion in Section B concludes with
contradictions and limitations in the SEC's vision to examine
domestic challenges that must be met whichever path is taken.
A.

Driving Forces

During most of the latter twentieth century, accounting systems
used in most countries developed within the traditions of each
country and varied considerably across them. But, as globalization
took hold in the century's final decades, appetite for a universal
system emerged. On the global stage, U.S. generally accepted
accounting principals ("GAAP") commonly was referenced as the
gold standard for this purpose.6 Serious efforts to develop a
comprehensive alternative international system began in 1973. 7 After
numerous fits and starts, international standards have begun to ripen
in the early twenty-first century into a comprehensive system
achieving broad international recognition. The SEC has maintained
abiding institutional commitment to this process and lately has taken
a bold lunge to embrace them.
6. See generally GARY JOHN PREVITS & BARBARA DUBIS MERINO, A HISTORY OF
ACCOUNTANCY

IN

THE

UNITED

STATES:

THE

CULTURAL

SIGNIFICANCE

OF

ACCOUNTING (rev. ed. 1998) (providing background on the development of accounting in

the latter part of the twentieth century).
7. See generally id. (discussing more background on developments in accounting
history).
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1. Origins

The quest for international accounting standards is motivated by
increased cross-border capital flows manifested in a spate of listings
abroad and an expansion of transnational business combinations.
Unsurprisingly, differences in national accounting standards and their
application in various countries produced markedly different reports
of income and equity, a phenomenon famously illustrated when
Daimler-Benz's traditional German accounting results differed
radically from the U.S. accounting standards it applied when it first
Difficulties associated with
listed in the United States.'
understanding and reconciling those differences increased the costs of
engaging in cross-border transactions.
Internationalization of accounting standards has historically
centered in London. There, in 1973, a fledgling group of accountants
assembled to begin a process of articulating global standards.9 The
organization, originally called the International Accounting
Standards Committee ("IASC"), was formed by agreement among
professional accountancy organizations in Australia, Canada, France,
Germany, Ireland, Japan, Mexico, the Netherlands, the United
Kingdom, and the United States.1" By 1983, IASC included all
professional accountancy bodies that were also members in the
International Federation of Accountants. 1
Between 1973 and 1987, IASC issued twenty-six accounting
standards (and by 2000 had issued a total of forty-one standards).
However, IASC lacked an effective governance structure and the
political clout to attract adherents. 13 Few of its standards were
recognized as worthy of serious attention, let alone sufficient for a
complete accounting system. The standards were too vague and
contained numerous optional approaches to reporting identical
transactions. The products were valuable for some developing
8. See David Waller, Daimler-Benz Gears Up for a Drive on the Freeway, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 29, 1993, at 18; Breeden Announces Daimler-Benz Will File to Trade Stock in
U.S. Markets, 25 SEC Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 477 (Apr. 2, 1993).

9. See PREVITS & MERINO, supra note 6, at 361 (noting, among other things, the rise
of international standards).
10.

See DAVID R. HERWITZ & MATrHEW J. BARRETT, ACCOUNTING FOR LAWYERS

174 (4th ed. 2006).
11. Id. at 174-75.
12. See Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in
Accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to
U.S. GAAP, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,962, 37,964 n.23 (Proposed July 2, 2007) (to be codified at 17
C.F.R. § 249.220f) [hereinafter, SEC Proposed Rule Rescinding Reconciliation].
13. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supranote 10, at 175-76.
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countries that lacked accounting standards and therefore adopted the
IASC standards. 4 But the founding countries of IASC largely
ignored the standards, preferring to use their own.
Efforts to strengthen IASC were redoubled in 1988 with backing
from the International Organization of Securities Commissions
("IOSCO").15 IASC began to review its standards, omit optional
treatments, enhance disclosure, and "specify in greater detail how
each standard was to be interpreted."16 The result was a formal 1995
agreement between IASC and IOSCO on a joint program to develop
standards comprehensively.17 This project led IOSCO, in 2000, to
endorse IASC revisions while permitting national securities
regulators to add requirements such as disclosure, specificity, and
reconciliation.1 8
During the 1990s, the SEC, long the overseer and protector of
U.S. GAAP, increased its interest in IASC and offered formal
guidance to promote its visibility and effectiveness. 19 In 1996,
Congress instructed the SEC to promote international accounting
standards and to prepare a report evaluating how to achieve a
universal system in the near or medium term. 2' Following Congress's
directive, the SEC offered IASC substantive and procedural advice.
On substance, the SEC emphasized that, to achieve requisite
stature, IASC needed to develop a comprehensive, high-quality,
generally accepted basis of accounting.2' It would be characterized by
transparency, comparability, and full disclosure and would be
susceptible to rigorous interpretation and enforcement. On process,
the SEC prescribed modeling IASC's governance structure after that
of the U.S. accounting standard-setting
body, the Financial
22
Accounting Standards Board ("FASB").

14. See id. at 175.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. See A.A. Sommer, Jr., IOSCO: Its Mission and Achievement, 17 Nw. J. INT'L L. &
Bus. 15, 24-25 (1996).
18. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 10, at 175.
19. See James D. Cox, Regulatory Duopoly in U.S. Securities Markets, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1200, 1208-09 (1999).

20. National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996, Sec. 509(5), 110 Stat. 3416;
see also U.S. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, REPORT ON PROMOTING
GLOBAL PREEMINENCE OF AMERICAN SECURITIES MARKETS (Oct. 1997), http://

www.sec.gov/news/studies/acctgsp.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
21. International Accounting Standards, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7801, 3442430; 65 Fed. Reg. 8,896, 8,897 (Feb. 23, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 240).
22. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 10, at 176.
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The SEC was able to exert this power over IASC because of how
it, along with U.S. GAAP, had consolidated a position as the gold
standard in financial reporting.
Beginning in 1983, non-U.S.
companies interested in accessing U.S. capital markets were required
to use U.S. GAAP, at least by reconciling their home-country
statements to it.2 3 Adding to its influence, some multinational
enterprises adopted U.S. GAAP completely, including Daimler-Benz,
the German automaker, who switched from German GAAP to U.S.
GAAP in 1993 to gain a U.S. listing. 4
U.S. GAAP's leadership paralleled U.S. leadership in capital
markets, which New York had dominated throughout the second half
of the twentieth century. Traditionally, a strong competitor in capital
market advancement was the United Kingdom, where London long
rivaled New York. In the early 1990s, after the collapse of the Soviet
Union and the end of the Cold War, world trade expanded and
capital flows began to move more freely and rapidly across more
national borders.
The existence of multiple, alternative accounting systems can
increase costs of cross-border deals. Multi-national enterprises based
in various countries moved from domestic accounting regimes toward
internationally useful and recognized systems. Most often, this meant
a shift from national accounting systems to U.S. GAAP, although
interest grew in the standards that IASC offered. Appetite for a
universal accounting system increased during the late 1990s and early
2000s as market integration accelerated.
Amid global capitalism, one may identify several choices that
appeared to meet the appetite for a global accounting system. First, a
single hegemonic power could provide its standards for the world,
which is what the United States did during the latter half of the
twentieth century. Second, a bloc of similarly-situated countries
engaged in extensive trading and other cross-border activity, such as
the European Union, could coordinate to reduce disparities and
alternative approaches that national accounting standards authorized.
Third, an international body attempting to represent all global
constituents could set world standards. That was the original purpose
of IASC and, as global capitalism spreads, is the approach being
favored and pursued.

23. See Adoption of Foreign Issuer Integrated Disclosure System, Securities Act
Release No. 33-6437, 47 Fed. Reg. 54,764, 54,764 (Dec. 6, 1982).
24. See supra note 8.
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Signaling belief in the possibility of moving from country-specific
accounting standards to an international approach, the SEC issued a
concept release in 2000 outlining essential elements of international
standards. 25 The SEC did not pursue this concept, however, as
accounting scandals at Enron and other companies diverted its
attention. Instead, it entered a period of domestic regulatory activity
that produced and implemented the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002
("SOX"). 2 6 Somewhat ironically, among the SEC's SOX-inspired
exercises was a study of other accounting systems that was critical of
U.S. GAAP and praised an emerging approach to international
27
accounting standards forged by IASC.
Also in 2000, IASC, now boasting more than one hundred
professional accountancy bodies, revised its governance along the
lines that the SEC had recommended. 8 It modeled itself closely after
FASB. This change was represented in a new constitution akin to
that used by FASB's parent organization, the Financial Accounting
Foundation. Symbolically, IASC renamed itself the International
Accounting Standards Board ("IASB") and renamed its standards as
29
International Financial Reporting Standards ("IFRS").
In addition to this renaming, IASB propounded new and revised
international accounting provisions that were destined to set another
gold standard in financial reporting. An example of the trailblazing
quality of these efforts was a standard on accounting for stock options

25. International Accounting Standards, Exchange Act Release Nos. 33-7801, 3442430; 65 Fed. Reg. 8,896, 8,897 (Feb. 23, 2000) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 230 & 240)
(stating that desired attributes of international standards are effective, independent, and
high quality standards accompanied by capable firms with quality controls and
backstopped by regulatory oversight conducting the auditing).
26. See Roberta S. Karmel, Securities Regulation: A New Watchdog for Public
Accountants, N.Y. L.J. (Aug. 15, 2002), at 3 (noting how SOX delivered reforms that the
SEC long had sought).
27. OFFICE OF THE CHIEF ACCOUNTANT, OFFICE OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, U.S.
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, STUDY PURSUANT TO SECTION 108(D) OF
THE SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 ON THE ADOPTION BY THE UNITED STATES
FINANCIAL REPORTING SYSTEM OF A PRINCIPLES-BASED ACCOUNTING SYSTEM (2003),

http://www.sec.gov/news/studies/principlesbasedstand.htm

[hereinafter SEC, SOX 108

STUDY].

28. See generally STRATEGIC WORKING PARTY, INTERNATIONAL ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS COMMITTEE, RECOMMENDATIONS ON SHAPING THE IASC FOR THE
FUTURE (1999), available at http://www.iasplus.com/restruct/1999swpfinal.pdf (detailing
recommendations made by the IASC's Working Party regarding proposed governance
structures).
29. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 10, at 176-77.
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in 2002, an accomplishment that had eluded FASB for a decade due
to domestic political resistance.3"
IASB also began a vigorous marketing campaign with numerous
countries and blocs to gain recognition.3 1 This led to the European
Union passing legislation in July 2002 to require all E.U.-listed
companies to use IFRS beginning in 2005 (subject to the European
Union's endorsement of each new standard as it was produced).3 2
Additionally, IASB's campaign led scores of other countries, from
Australia to Singapore, to embrace its standards (subject, in most
cases, to the same endorsement mechanism).33 Others, including
Japan and the United States, agreed with IASB to work to converge
national standards and IFRS.34
During this period, increased coordination also occurred
between the United States and European Union. In June 2004, the
SEC and the Committee of European Securities Regulators
("CESR") agreed to increase collaboration on accounting
convergence, including a commitment to concentrate on consistent
application, interpretation, and enforcement of IFRS.35 Within one
year, the SEC unveiled a "roadmap" to convergence (including
ending the U.S. reconciliation requirement for non-U.S. issuers by
2009 or sooner), and the CESR declared that U.S. GAAP was
substantially equivalent to the European Union's IFRS.36
Next, in August 2006, the SEC and CESR reaffirmed and
deepened their earlier commitment in a formal work plan to
accelerate joint investment in IFRS.37
Meeting the roadmap
commitment, the SEC ended the reconciliation requirement in late
30. See ARTHUR LEVITT, TAKE ON THE STREET 109-13,241 (2002).
31. See David Tweedie, Setting a Global Standard: The Case for Accounting
Convergence, 25 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 589, 592-93 (2005) (showing the reflections of
IASB's principal leader).
32. EUR. PARL. Doc. PE 308.463, available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/
meetdocs/committees/uri/20020225/461067EN.pdf.
33. See Donald T. Nicolaisen, A Securities Regulator Looks at Convergence, 25 NW. J.
INT'L L. & Bus. 661, 664-65 (2005).
34. See Press Release, International Accounting Standards Board, IASB and
Accounting Standards Board of Japan Agree to Next Steps in Launching Joint Project for
Convergence (Jan. 21, 2005), available at http://www.iasb.org/news; Financial Accounting
Standards Board and International Accounting Standards Board, Memorandum of
Understanding, "The Norwalk Agreement," available at http://www.fasb.org/news/
memorandum.pdf (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
35. See Press Release, SEC, SEC-CESR Set Out the Shape of Future Collaboration
(June 4, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/ress/2004-75.htm.
36. See Nicolaisen, supra note 33, at 673-74.
37. Press Release, SEC, SEC and CESR Launch Work Plan Focused on Financial
Reporting (Aug. 2, 2006), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2006/2006-130.htm.
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2007; more extraordinarily, it floated the idea of letting U.S. issuers
choose to adopt IFRS instead of U.S. GAAP. s The SEC did so with
a bootstrap argument; it said that if non-U.S. issuers could use IFRS,
then fairness required that U.S. issuers should be able to do so too.3 9
This review of the road to global accounting standards
demonstrates the SEC's steady support for international accounting
standards. Yet it can be difficult to ascribe a single institutional view
to the SEC. The agency is large and complex. Its leadership changes

over time and is appointed by the President under a statute requiring
bipartisan diversity. Its staff engages in projects that span leadership
regimes. 4° Against this backdrop, international accounting projects

have been ongoing for decades. Official documents and decisions
sometimes influence the range of possible positions that subsequent
leadership can take, although leaders can shift the agency's vision. A

striking example occurred when the SEC adopted the reconciliation
requirement in 1983, and then rescinded it in 2007. 4"
Nothing that the SEC did between 1983 and 2007 required this
shift. Official SEC pronouncements routinely stated goals but no
deadlines, and few formal action plans.4 2 True, the SEC expressed
clear direction and support for cooperation with CESR and IOSCO
and the IASB in its 2004 roadmap. 43 But none of these expressions

required contemplating either an optional or mandatory switch by
U.S. companies to IFRS. 4 It is this sharp forward shift that I shall be
38. SEC Proposed Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 12; SEC Concept
Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,601.
39. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,602-03
(stating that the SEC's proposal to rescind reconciliation "raises the question of whether
the [SEC] also should accept financial statements prepared in accordance with IFRS as
published by the IASB from U.S. issuers" (emphasis added)).
40. For an overview of the SEC, see The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects
Investors, Maintains Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation,
http://www.sec.gov/about/whatwedo.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
41. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 2007 PERFORMANCE AND
ACCOUNTABILITY

REPORT 35,

available at http://www.sec.gov/about/secpar/secpar

2007.pdf.
42. See, e.g., SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,600 ("The
Commission has long advocated reducing disparity between the accounting and disclosure
practices of the United States and other countries .... ).
43. See Press Release, SEC, Accounting Standards: SEC Chairman COX and EU
Commissioner McGreevy Affirm Commitment to Elimination of the Need for
Reconciliation Requirements (Feb. 8, 2006), available at www.sec.gov/news/press/200617.htm (providing the SEC Chairman's statement reaffirming commitment set out in
roadmap described by the SEC's Chief Accountant in 2004).
44. Nevertheless, the SEC's institutional interest and global pressure favoring IFRS
generated considerable scholarly commentary in recent years. See, e.g., Bernhard
Grossfeld, Comparative CorporateGovernance: Generally Accepted Accounting Principles
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characterizing, diagnosing, and criticizing as the SEC's global
accounting vision.
Two explanations appear for this abrupt shift going beyond
traditional institutional commitment.
First, as to rescinding
reconciliation, the E.U. exerts political pressure on the SEC. If the
SEC failed to rescind its reconciliation rule, backlash from the
European Union likely would have occurred. Second, as to floating
the domestic option, the SEC's leadership, especially Chairman
Christopher Cox, is invested in the issue as a matter of personal and
political legacy, putting it high on the policy agenda.4 5
Despite this considerable personal and institutional investment,
the SEC ultimately retreated from its ambitions. In late August 2008,
it announced instead that it would issue for public comment a release
seeking input on a proposal for the SEC to reconsider in 2011
whether moving to IFRS by 2014 would be prudent.
2. Vagueness
A combination of institutional vigor and political momentum
thus enabled IASB to catapult itself onto the world stage in a visible
and influential way during the early 2000s. Additional factors
contributed to this impressive showing, many beyond the SEC's
capacity to control, but these factors developed at a propitious time
for the SEC's vision. These factors centered on surprising global
enthusiasm for the notion that IASB's standards, IFRS, largely took

v. InternationalAccounting Standards?, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG 847, 847 (2003);
Isaac C. Hunt, Jr., It's a Small World After All: The SEC's Role in Securities Regulation
Globalization, 51 ADMIN. L. REV. 1105, 1105 (1999); George Mundstock, The Trouble
with FASB, 28 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COMM. REG. 813, 813 (2003); Michael A. Schneider,
Foreign Listings and the Preeminence of U.S. Securities Exchanges: Should the SEC
Recognize Foreign Accounting Standards?, 3 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 301, 301 (1994);
Eric M. Sherbet, Bridging the GAAP: Accounting Standardsfor Foreign SEC Registrants,
29 INT'L LAW. 875, 875 (1995); Samuel Wolff, Implementation of InternationalDisclosure
Standards, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 91, 91 (2001); Janice Grant Brunner, Comment, All
Together Now? The Quest for International Accounting Standards, 20 U. PA. J. INT'L
ECON. L. 911, 911 (1999); Scott B. Novak, Note, A Step Toward Globalization: The Move
for InternationalAccounting Standards, 9 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 203,203 (1998).
45. See Floyd Norris, A Tower of Babel in Accounting?, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2007, at
C1 ("Christopher Cox, the SEC chairman, is pushing for prompt action, which could make

globalization of markets his legacy by the time he steps down after a new president takes
office in 2009."). This is not necessarily a rebuke to Chairman Cox, for a function of
agency commissioners is to set the policy agenda and exert leadership. In any such
context, however, challenges arise to assure sufficient research, analysis, and
communications are established to enable a policy to succeed. In the case of the SEC and
IFRS at present, there is considerable doubt about its probability of success despite the
Chairman's considerable investment.
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the form of principles as opposed to rules whenever that was possible.
This enthusiasm was a stunning turnabout since IASC standards set
from 1973 to 1987 and into the late 1990s were criticized and did not
catch on because they were too loose and vague.46 Participants had
advised IASC to provide more detail and guidance to enable uniform
interpretation and enforcement.4 7 However, the qualities of looseness
and vagueness and absence of detail and guidance became an asset in
the early 2000s.
Earlier objections to IASC's relatively vague standards were
based on the requirement that an accounting system must provide
sufficient definiteness. Specifically, an accounting system must enable
preparation of financial statements that meet basic criteria that are
recognized worldwide for reliability and usefulness. Such a system is
reliable when it is capable of transparently capturing, aggregating,
and summarizing vast quantities of transactions with varying qualities,
which is possible only if standards are sufficiently comprehensive to
address most transaction types and categories.
To be useful, an accounting system must facilitate comparability
across enterprises. Thus, one risk of principles that are too generic is
that the role of subjective judgment diminishes the comparability of
resulting statements. Yet that risk of excessive generality is offset by
four forces, detailed below, that induced the global reversal from
viewing IASC's standards as too generic to applauding that quality in
IFRS.
First, in the earlier period, there was less pressure for countries
supporting IASC to adopt its standards. For example, countries like
Australia, Britain, Germany, and France had respected systems;
therefore, IASC standards were generally only taken up by less
developed countries that lacked accounting traditions, such as
countries in Eastern Europe and former members of the Soviet
Union. The pressure equation changed as the value of international
standards increased to developed countries amid post-Cold War
globalization.
Second, to command acceptance among far-flung participants,
from the European Union to the United States and scores of other
countries, it is helpful for accounting standards to be written at a
relatively high level of generality. If too detailed or overly tailored to
specific attributes of particular nations, the standards appeal only to
those nations and not to others.
46. See supra text accompanying notes 12-20.
47. See HERWITZ& BARRET, supra note 10, at 175.
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Third, literal and functional translation costs are proportional to
the relative generality or specificity of the original text. Because of
language differences, it is necessary to translate the standards from
their original language, English, into other languages. More general
language is easier to translate into other languages and easier for
readers of the translated texts to comprehend.
Fourth, the relative generality of IFRS was more appealing in the
early 2000s than before because of events in the United States that
reverberated worldwide. It may have been tempting to attribute the
Enron debacle to how U.S. GAAP were too detailed and had too
many rules. Enron's managers-and managers at other companies in
the heady period-appeared to manipulate U.S. GAAP's rules by
designing transactions that could opaquely avoid triggering adverse
accounting results and enable reporting beneficial ones.48 Critics of
U.S. GAAP, and foes of using rules in regulation generally, offered
such examples as evidence that rules are costly and that it is better to
regulate and design accounting systems using principles.49
However, these complaints overstated the case, since what
Enron's managers did plainly violate U.S. GAAP.5 ° Yet critics
argued persuasively that U.S. GAAP had too many rules and left too
little room for judgment. If only U.S. GAAP used more principles
and required more judgment, critics said, Enron's shenanigans would
have been preempted. If rules were now bad, principles were not
only good, but also a solution to a nettling problem bedeviling the
United States.5 1 With loose, vague principles bearing limited detail
and guidance in fashion, rhetoric emerged to classify and denigrate
U.S. GAAP as "rules-based" and to classify and extol IFRS as
"principles-based." Given the current climate, this labeling improved
the marketability of IFRS and contributed to the declining appeal of
U.S. GAAP.

48. See William W. Bratton, Enron, Sarbanes-Oxley and Accounting: Rules Versus
Principles Versus Rents, 48 VILL. L. REV. 1023, 1030 (2003).
49. See Editorial, Closing the GAAP, WALL ST. J., Dec. 12, 2007, at A18.
50. See WILLIAM C. POWERS, JR. ET AL., REPORT OF INVESTIGATION BY THE

SPECIAL INVESTIGATIVE COMMITTEE OF THE BOARD OF DIRECTORS OF ENRON CORP.
3-4 (2002).

51. Rhetoric aside, characterizing any complex system as "principles-based" or "rulesbased" is facile at best. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, A Prescription to Retire the
Rhetoric of "Principles-Based Systems" in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and
Accounting, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1411, 1473-74 (2007). See generally David Alexander &
Eva Jermakowicz, A True and Fair View of the Principles/Rules Debate, 42 ABACUS 132,

161 (2006) ("Much of the debate at the regulatory and policy level is at best vague and
confused, more likely disingenuous, possibly intellectually dishonest.").
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Despite the dubious utility of such labeling, the issue of types of
accounting systems was taken so seriously that SOX required the
SEC to study it. 2 The SEC sensibly avoided endorsing the facile idea
that such things as principles-based or rules-based accounting systems
exist. Instead, it minted the concept of an objectives-based system.
Rules and principles both are useful, the SEC correctly explained,
although it expressed preference for principles over rules when
possible.
This position is repeated in official SEC releases.53
Additionally, an expert advisory committee, which the SEC formed
to simplify accounting, opines that the so-called rules-principles
debate is specious.54 Most agreed with the committee, including two
SEC Commissioners. 5 Yet, another Commissioner and the SEC
Chairman continued to parrot the call for "principles-based" systems,
evidencing the strength of the IASB's marketing strategy.56
Further, the rhetoric that condemned rules-based systems and
extolled principles-based systems was echoed in a wider backlash
against the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in the mid-2000s. Three widelypublicized domestic reports circulated criticizing the U.S. regulatory
environment, routinely calling it rules-based and advocating a
52. SEC, SOX 108 STUDY, supra note 27.
53. SEC Proposed Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 12, at 37,966; SEC
Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,606.
54. See SEC ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON IMPROVEMENTS TO FINANCIAL
REPORTING, SUBCOMMITTEE I: SUBSTANTIVE COMPLEXITY, REPORT FOR DISCUSSION
AT NOV. 2, 2007 FULL COMMITTEE MEETING, at 9, http://www.sec.gov/about/
offices/oca/acifr/acifr-scl-report.pdf ("The subcommittee believes that the principles vs.
rules dichotomy is a specious debate.").
55. See Roel C. Campos, SEC Comm'r, Remarks at SEC Open Meeting: Concept
Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to Use IFRS (July 25, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spchO72507rcc.htm ("There's been a great deal of
talk about the fact that IFRS is more principles-based, as compared to U.S. GAAP, which
is supposedly more rules-based .... I think this is an oversimplification."); Annette L.
Nazareth, SEC Comm'r, Remarks Before the Council of Institutional Investors (March 20,
2007), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spchO32007aln.htm ("There has
been much discussion recently about the benefits of principles versus rules-based
regulation ....I believe that this is a false dichotomy.").
56. See Kathleen L. Casey, SEC Comm'r, Remarks at the 35th Annual AICPA
National Conference on Current SEC and PCAOB Developments (Dec. 10, 2007),
available at http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch121007klc.htm
(describing the
movement to IFRS as a "principles-based initiative" and contrasting it to the "current
rules-based accounting system"); Christopher Cox, SEC Chair, SEC Roundtable on
International Financial Reporting Standards (March 6, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spchO30607cc.htm [hereinafter "SEC Roundtable"]
("Enron and the wave of accounting scandals called into question the intensely rule-based
approach of U.S. GAAP ... SOX expressly required that we examine the length of time
that would be necessary to change from a rules-based to a principles-based financial
reporting system.").
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principles-based approach to regulation.57 The slogans in this context
were used to support less regulation and more deference to targeted

actors' judgments, which has the same effect as using principles
instead of rules in accounting. Unsurprisingly, the conclusion of all

three reports blamed the U.S. regulatory environment for an asserted
decline in U.S. capital market competitiveness, and all cited, among

other culprits, too many accounting rules.58
However, the asserted link between U.S. competitiveness and

the use of rules in accounting or other regulations was overstated
political oratory. Indeed, it may have been backwards. Before the
rise of IFRS, few countries had the infrastructure required to raise
and trade large amounts of capital. But, by the early twenty-first
century, this was no longer an obstacle.59 As capitalism flourishes,
U.S. markets no longer are the principal place to generate capital;
many foreign companies raise it in local markets. This is a testament

to U.S. success in spreading capitalism, a feat capitalists should not
lament, but celebrate. If U.S. GAAP had anything to do with this
expansion, it was not to retard but to advance it. It is odd, then, to
blame U.S. GAAP for any decline in U.S. competitiveness, real or
perceived.60
57. COMM. ON CAPITAL MKTS. REGULATION, INTERIM REPORT, at xii (2006),
[hereinafter Paulson Report], available at http://www.capmktsreg.org/pdfs/11.30
CommitteeInterimReportREV2.pdf (commissioned by U.S. Treasury Secretary Henry
M. Paulson, Jr.); MCKINSEY & CO., SUSTAINING NEW YORK'S AND THE U.S.' GLOBAL

FINANCIAL SERVICES LEADERSHIP, at 110 (2007), [hereinafter McKinsey Report],
available at http://www.nyc.gov/html/om/pdflny-report-final.pdf (commissioned by New
York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg and U.S. Senator Charles Schumer (NY)); CENTER
FOR

CAPITAL

MARKETS

COMPETITIVENESS,

U.S.

CHAMBER

OF

COMMERCE,

STRENGTHENING U.S. CAPITAL MARKETS 24 (March 2008), [hereinafter CHAMBER OF

COMMERCE REPORT], available at http://www.uschamber.com/ccmc/0803capmarkets.htm
(select "Download the full report").
58. See PAULSON REPORT, supra note 57, at 88; MCKINSEY REPORT, supra note 57,

at 89, 110; CHAMBER OF COMMERCE REPORT, supra note 57, at 20, 28.
59. Several cities had grown in significance as centers of capital activity, especially
Hong Kong and Tokyo, but also Frankfurt. Although tiny, nascent, and fragile, even
places like Moscow and Beijing embraced capital market activity, an astonishing reversal
from erstwhile communist economic orders.
60. Growing interest in international standards, as opposed to U.S. standards,
coincided with other international opposition to U.S. leadership. In the decades following
the Soviet Union's collapse, the United States became the world's lone super-power. It is
common in geopolitical history for such hegemonic states to earn the enmity of other
nations and their citizens. Enmity strengthens amid fears that the hegemonic power slides
from that quasi-benevolent status to a more imperialist one. That fear gathered force
during the period of IFRS's rise, from 2000 to 2008, the term of office of President George
W. Bush, whose foreign policy aggressively projected U.S. military and economic power.
See Jane Mayer, The Hidden Power: The Legal Mind Behind the White House's War on
Terror, NEW YORKER, July 3, 2006, at 44. How much this political atmosphere
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In sum, the rise of IFRS from humble origins to world leadership
is driven primarily by expanding global capitalism that is reinforced
by rhetoric condemning the density of U.S. accounting standards.
Fueling demand for both capitalist expansion and vaguer standards is
the need to compare enterprises regardless of geography. Most
champions of IFRS, and even those preferring continued convergence
of national into universal standards, emphasize comparability as the
primary virtue of the quest.6 1 Comparability means broader and
deeper low-cost capital flowing through a limitless number of global
channels. Yet, as discussed next, realizing this virtue remains elusive,
and the SEC both discounts the significance of persistent divergence
and floats policies that threaten comparability.
3. Divergence
The road to a single set of standards has emphasized projects
that converge existing country standards, especially U.S. GAAP, with
IFRS. However, how to define the meaning, progress, and purpose of
convergence is contestable.
Convergence could mean achieving
identical standards or even sufficient similarity in order for financial
statements to be rendered comparable with little user effort.
Substantial progress has been made toward having the two sets of
standards address similar issues in substantially similar ways.
However, complete convergence remains a distant dream. The
following Section discusses three broad examples of persistent
divergence: (1) differences in results produced by IFRS and U.S.
GAAP; (2) differences in results appearing in different countries
using IFRS; and (3) differences in the form of IFRS presentation.
The Section concludes by discussing how the SEC responds to this
persistent divergence.
First, variation endures between IFRS statements and U.S.
GAAP statements. Of the 130 SEC filings by foreign private issuers
covering fiscal year 2006 and containing IFRS reports reconciled to
U.S. GAAP, only two reported identical income amounts.62 The
variations tend to result in higher reported TIFRS earnings than U.S.
contributed to declining U.S. leadership prowess, competiveness or SEC authority is
uncertain (and may be de minimus), but the environment certainly did not help on any of
those fronts. See STEPHEN BURMAN, THE STATE OF THE AMERICAN EMPIRE: HOW THE
USA SHAPES THE WORLD 110-11 (2007).

61. See infra text accompanying note 87.
62. See International Accounting Standards: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Securities, Insurance, and Investment of the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban
Affairs, 110th Cong., at D1413 (Oct. 24, 2007) (testimony of Jack Ciesielski, President,
R&G Associates).
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GAAP (eighty-four of these instances existed, by a median
differentiation of 12.9%), although there were also forty-four
instances where IFRS reported lower earnings than GAAP (by a
median difference of 9.1%).63 The wide variation is attributable to
enduring differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP.

Evidence

demonstrates increasing

divergence rather

than

convergence between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. A recent study of
eighty-three E.U.-U.S. cross-listed firms shows the gap growing
compared to earlier studies.6 Also, most firms' IFRS results show
materially higher income and lower equity compared to U.S.

GAAP.65 Across the European Union, differences are significantly
influenced by the legal origin of the firm's home country (i.e.,
common law or civil law traditions).66 Dominant reconciliation items
are pensions and goodwill, despite being subjects of convergence

projects. Other studies generally appear consistent with these
conclusions, justifying skepticism about current prospects for a global
standard.6 7
Second, divergence also persists among companies purporting to
apply IFRS. An SEC review of 2006 IFRS filings illustrates this
concept.68 There is variation in the basis of reporting used. Most
companies report using IFRS as published by IASB. However, the

vast majority of these companies also assert that statements comply
with various country-specific variations of IFRS. 69 Accompanying

63. Id. at 6.
64. See Elaine Henry, Steve W.J. Lin & Ya-Wen Yang, The European-U.S. GAAP
Gap: Amount, Type, Homogeneity, and Value Relevance of IFRS to U.S. GAAP Form 20F Reconciliations, at 11 (SSRN, Working Paper No. 982481, 2007), available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=982481 (revealing a widening of the gap compared to previous
findings from 1999).
65. Id.
66. See infra text accompanying notes 148-59.
67. See Donna L. Street, International Convergence of Accounting Standards: What
Investors Need to Know (Oct. 2, 2007), available at http://www.cii.org/
resourcespublications (select the article under the heading "Council White Papers and
Reports"); see also D. Jetuah, Citigroup Lays out IFRS-U.S. GAAP Gulf, ACCOUNTANCY
AGE, Aug. 30, 2007, at 9 (reporting on similar results from Citigroup survey).
68. See SEC, Staff Observations in the Review of IFRS Financial Statements (July 2,
2007), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/ifrs_staffobservations.htm [hereinafter SEC,
Staff Observations]; see also SEC, Staff Comments on Annual Reports Containing
Financial Statements Prepared for the First Time on the Basis of International Financial
Reporting Standards (2007), http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfinlifrsreviews.htm (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008) [hereinafter SEC, Staff Comments on Annual Reports] (listing SEC
comment letters on that year's FPI IFRS financial statements).
69. See SEC, Staff Observations, supra note 68 ("We found that the vast majority of
companies asserted compliance with a jurisdictional version of IFRS and that most also
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auditing opinions tend to attest to the country-specific versions rather
than to the IASB version.70
Third, the form of presenting financial statements varies, even
among companies based in the same country and operating in the
same industry. 71 This finding may be due, in part, to IFRS allowing
variation in forms, offering no specific directions concerning how the
income statement should be presented. As a result, income statement
totals use a wide variety of different names and omit customary line
items.72 Moreover, it is not always clear how per share amounts are
determined (such as on a diluted or other basis).
Additionally, material variation in the presentation of statements
of cash flows also exists. Companies use different starting points to
show how cash flows vary from accrual income figures. Some
interpret the concept of cash equivalents in broader terms than the
SEC's interpretation of the applicable international standard,7 3 while
some cash flows are wrongly classified as arising from investing
activities compared to operating activities (especially cash flows
relating to research or exploration costs).
Material variation appears in accounting for contexts that IFRS
does not address or for which it offers limited guidance. These
variations include control transactions
such as mergers,
recapitalizations,
reorganizations,
and
minority
interests.
Unfortunately, it is often unclear why a company chose not to
consolidate a subsidiary or to use the equity method of accounting for
investments in certain affiliates. When IFRS is silent on a subject, it
directs using a standard from another recognized system of

asserted compliance with IFRS as published by the International Accounting Standards
Board, commonly referred to as the IASB.")
70. Id. ("In the vast majority of the companies we reviewed, the company's auditor
opined on the company's compliance with the jurisdictional version of IFRS that the
company used, but did not opine on the company's compliance with IFRS as published by
the IASB.").
71. Id. (finding that companies based in the same jurisdiction and industries
sometimes used different formats for their income statements).
72. Id. (discussing the wide variations in calculations made in each system).
73. The applicable international standard on cash equivalents is IAS No. 7. The fact
that the SEC has an interpretation of its meaning that differs from the interpretations
evident in the filings it reviewed suggests some of the problems that can arise from
national interpretations or from using principles instead of rules in IFRS. Sustained
variation in the statement of cash flows is particularly significant because the SEC has
allowed foreign private issuers to file non-GAAP cash flow statements without
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP since 1994. See SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS,
supra note 1, at 45,606 n.40.
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accounting, such as U.S. GAAP.74 Further confounding the situation,
companies do not always state the accounting standard they apply
when IFRS does not supply one.
Moreover, as a general matter, numerous topics in accounting
pose problems of clarity or inconsistency, and many of these
problems are fundamental to accounting. Fundamental problem
areas in accounting include: revenue recognition, accounting for
intangible assets and goodwill, asset impairment measurement and
recognition, accounting for leases, contingent liabilities, and
accounting for financial instruments.
Despite these three forms of evidence showing persistent
divergence, the SEC cites the data to suggest that it commands
required expertise to operate in an IFRS environment. Its final rule
rescinding the reconciliation requirement boasts that the "staff has
gained an increasing understanding of the application of IFRS
standards through its regular review of the periodic reports of
publicly registered companies."75 Additionally, the SEC states that
the issues observed in its review of IFRS variation "do not appear to
be more pervasive or significant than those it has identified in U.S.
GAAP financial statements. ' 76 It attributes some of the manifest
divergence between U.S. GAAP and IFRS to: (1) legacy differences
that occurred before convergence efforts were undertaken; and (2)
differences arising from issuers choosing from alternative accounting
options permitted under IFRS and U.S. GAAP.77
Even so, the SEC recognizes that, although a single set of
standards should "have positive effects on investors '78 from
comparability, variation poses costs to investors:
[T]he benefits of a single set of globally accepted, high-quality
accounting standards that improve financial statement
comparability may be diminished if there is a wide latitude in
application of IFRS that results in inconsistent reporting. This
latitude potentially harms investors' ability to compare financial
74. See

IASC

FOUNDATION,

ACCOUNTING POLICIES, CHANGES IN
(2008), available at http://www.iasb.org/
NRIrdonlyresl14B58346-6COF-45FE-A240-89EDF8A1E930O/IAS8.pdf
(describing the
steps by which IAS No. 39 affects the IFRS' plan).
ACCOUNTING

ESTIMATES

AND

IAS 8

ERRORS

75. Acceptance from Foreign Private Issuers of Financial Statements Prepared in
Accordance With International Financial Reporting Standards Without Reconciliation to
U.S. GAAP, 73 Fed. Reg. 986, 991 (Jan. 4, 2008) [hereinafter SEC Final Rule Rescinding
Reconciliation] (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 210, 230, 239, & 249).

76. Id. at 992.
77. Id. at 1001, 1007.
78. Id. at 1006.
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statements across companies and potentially
allows more
79
opportunity for obfuscatory [sic] reporting.
The SEC nevertheless dismisses these concerns, saying investors
should be able to "understand and work" with FRS reports, "likely
resulting in a more efficient allocation of capital.8" The SEC's
prognosis is based on hoped-for benefits from expected network
effects: it theorizes that the more companies that use IFRS, the more
others have incentive to do so, and the more investor utility
increases.81
The SEC's optimism, despite the evidence, contrasts with
concerns expressed by its British counterpart, the Financial Services
Authority, based on a similar study and findings of 284 filings.82 In
the FSA's review of the appeal and risks of IFRS, it cited inconsistent
national application as a material risk.83 It noted the widely accepted
premise that IFRS' value can only be realized by comparable
applications across borders.84 Then it cautioned: "[T]here may be
relevant economic and legal differences between countries such that
similar transactions might legitimately be reported in different ways.
[S]hould local custom or national interest operate to threaten the
consistent application of IFRS, much of this anticipated benefit [of
comparability] could be lost."85 This sensible cautionary note could
be stated less diplomatically by adding that interest group politics
within a nation also can destroy any benefits of this quest.
B.

Crossroads

The SEC's longstanding institutional interest in international
accounting standards, plus contemporary
geopolitics and
geocapitalism, contributes to understanding the alacrity of its current
vision. Yet, along with its discounting of significant persistent
divergence, the factors discussed in the following analysis suggest that
more than historical interest is behind the SEC's current embrace of
IFRS. These factors, discussed sequentially in this Section, include:

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. See id.
82. See FINANCIAL SERVICES AUTHORITY, FINANCIAL RISK OUTLOOK 2007, at 11215 (2007), available at http://www.steelhenge.co.uk/knowledgezone/financial risk-outlook
_2007.pdf.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. at 112.
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contradictions, the SEC's dubious assertion of power, and inattention
to numerous systemic implications.
1. Comparability and Competition

In the United States, most agree on the goal of comparability and
that achieving it requires a single set of standards. All agree that
convergence between U.S. GAAP and FRS has been substantial but

is incomplete.

Some favor continuing convergence before making

any changes; others say moving to IFRS now will advance the goal of
global comparability sooner.8 6
Even the SEC's official
pronouncements routinely emphasize the goal and virtue of
comparability.8 7

However, the SEC's proposals envision competition between
FASB/U.S. GAAP and IASB/IFRS. 8s The SEC's Concept Release
on domestic issuers allows issuers to choose either U.S. GAAP or
IFRS without mentioning the possibility of an across-the-board

mandatory switch to IFRS.89 The latter idea originated in scores of
86. When evaluating the pace of convergence, it is possible to accept that the progress
to date, while slow, can continue and reach a stage of substantial similarity within the next
decade or sooner. Conviction that rapid capital globalization is desirable could justify
preference for equally rapid implementation of IFRS. On the other hand, IASB's
investment in convergence projects with the United States and other countries is
stimulated by its desire to persuade those countries to recognize IFRS. Once recognized,
that incentive likely will be reduced. As between the immediate optional or planned
mandatory route, the analysis in this Article supports the latter, because it will reduce the
serious risks associated with these pressures.
87. See, e.g., Press Release, SEC, SEC Takes Action to Improve Consistency of
Disclosure to U.S. Investors in Foreign Companies (Nov. 16, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-235.htm ("Consistent application of international
accounting standards will help the two-thirds of U.S. investors who own foreign securities
to understand and draw better comparisons among investment options than they could
with a multiplicity of national accounting standards." (quoting SEC Chairman Christopher
Cox)); SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,604 ("The use of a
single set of accounting standards in the preparation of financial statements could help
investors understand opportunities better than the use of multiple differing sets of national
accounting standards, [whereas multiple standards] can cause confusion."); SEC Proposed
Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 12, at 37,967 ("The use of a common set of
high-quality standards for the preparation of financial statements will help investors to
understand investment opportunities more clearly and with greater comparability than if
they had to gain familiarity with a multiplicity of national accounting standards."); id. at
37,970 ("Fostering the use of a single set of high-quality, globally accepted accounting
principles, would, in our view, serve to protect investors and promote capital formation by
enhancing comparability across companies and increasing access to foreign issuer
investment opportunities for investors in the U.S. public capital markets while reducing
regulatory burdens and costs for issuers.").
88. See SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supranote 1, at 45,600.
89. See id. (seeking input to understand the public's interest in giving U.S. issuers the
option to file IFRS financial statements instead of U.S. GAAP financial statements).
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comment letters, many showing coordinated responses from trade
groups (especially the large auditing firms), and from accounting
standard-setters such as FAF and FASB.9" It is essentially impossible
to square support for comparability with enthusiasm for competition.
The contradiction leads to an SEC vision exhibiting, at times, a
tortured logic, such as when it heralds the value of a single standard
while endorsing the existence of dual standards for the United
States.91
Nevertheless, a major issue now is whether the United States
should require companies to use IFRS or give them the option to do
so. This is the major issue, because it reflects and must be informed
by all other issues associated with any movement toward
international standards. Giving companies the option to use IFRS
would mean two sets of standards in the United States. This would
reduce comparability among domestic companies while promoting
comparability among multi-national ones. It may be possible to
tolerate some such non-comparability, but only for a short period.
This idea is especially so if only a relatively small number of U.S.
issuers make that choice, which is likely to happen given that the
option would almost certainly appeal only to the largest corporations
with a sizable global footprint.
Allowing the option would create head-to-head competition
between IFRS and U.S. GAAP. There may be benefits from such a
duopoly of standards. One advantage of a market in accounting
standards in which multiple standard-setters compete is the creation
of incentives to develop innovative ways of presenting financial
information that can be more useful to investors.92 It is a tacit
recognition that a single set of standards will not necessarily produce

90. See, e.g., SEC, Comments on Concept Release on Allowing U.S. Issuers to
Prepare Financial Statements in Accordance with International Financial Reporting
Standards, http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-20-07/s72007.shtml (including the following
comment letters: Deloitte & Touche LLP (Nov. 13, 2007); Ernst & Young LLP (Nov. 13,
2007); KPMG LLP (Nov. 9, 2007); PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP (Nov. 12, 2007); and
Financial Accounting Foundation (Nov. 7, 2007)).
91. See SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 989-90
(heralding the value of a single set of standards while endorsing the existence of two sets
of standards).
92. See generally Ronald A. Dye & Shyam Sunder, Why Not Allow FASB and IASB
Standards to Compete in the U.S.?, 15 Accr. HORIZONS 257, 260-61 (2001) (articulating

disadvantages

of the standards

duopoly);

Shyam

Sunder, Introduce Regulatory

Competition to Simplify Financial Reporting (SSRN, Working Paper No. 969733, 2007),

available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=969733 (articulating advantages of the standards
duopoly).
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comparability in fact. Even so, several well-recognized downsides to
accounting standards competition exist.
First, the purpose of accounting is to generate useful information
in an environment where preparers have informational advantages.
Second,
This presents a problem of asymmetric information.
enjoy
their
accounting standards are public goods in that investors
benefits without having to pay for them directly. This introduces a
free rider problem that impairs the usual functions of supply and
demand. Third, it is unlikely that market competition in standards
production would enable preparation of comparable financial
statements.93 This defeats an important objective of accounting
standards. Fourth, in a global environment, prospects diminish for
competition among standards to yield a comparable basis of
accounting. Again, this defeats an important objective of accounting
standards.
Besides these well-recognized downsides to competition among
accounting standards, two novel points are revealed by the foregoing
analysis. First, IASB's marketing campaign that celebrates IFRS as
principles-based may, in this author's view, involve material
misstatements. Regulatory officials, including accounting standardsetters, can avoid this condition by making statements that mislead
participants into making incorrect choices.
Second, current demand for global standards rejects historical
national standards competition. This rejection is epitomized by the
European Union's mandate to replace dozens of competing national
standards with the single set of IFRS for all members. Specifically,
the European Union favors a single set to promote comparability for
the sake of global capital flows and to expand capitalism into places
as unlikely as China and Russia.94
In contrast to an optional approach, a planned mandatory switch
for all U.S. issuers would advance these objectives and promote
comparability both internationally and domestically. To achieve
93. The familiar and essentially non-resolvable debate concerning whether standards
competition would induce a race to the top, bottom, or nowhere in particular appears in
this context as well.
94. A third problem with accounting regime duopoly is the difficulty and cost of
training participants in different standards. Adopting IFRS in lieu of U.S. GAAP in the
United States would require an expensive one-time overhaul, a problem discussed further
below. But overhaul costs are likely to be less than costs of ongoing education necessary
to train people in two sets of standards. Ongoing costs would fall on both formal
pedagogical institutions, like colleges and universities, and informal, on-the-job training
within firms. The costs affect accountants, auditors, managers, investors, and all other
users of financial information.

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

broader objectives associated with global capitalism's expansion
suggests that full-scale U.S. adoption is desirable. The optimal
solution could be to allow the option, accompanied with a plan, by a
date certain, to switch all U.S. issuers to IFRS. Unfortunately, the
SEC's concept release does not discuss this strategy.95 Yet virtues of
the proposed broader plan include involving all participants in the
transition and, as discussed in the next two Subsections, providing
time to make the tremendous adjustments required.
2. SEC Authority
A preliminary and profound adjustment concerns the SEC's
authority to recognize standard-setters other than FASB and systems
other than U.S. GAAP. The SEC routinely asserts that it has this
authority, but, as the following elementary legal analysis indicates,
this is a dubious claim.
The SEC's flexibility to recognize accounting standard-setters is
long-standing and dates back to the 1930s. Nonetheless, the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, passed in 2002, imposed boundaries on SEC
authority. SOX listed numerous criteria that any SEC delegate must
possess in order for the SEC to recognize it as a U.S. accounting
standard-setter. 96 The delegate must: (1) be a private entity; (2) have
a board serving the public interest, a majority of whose members are
independent of the accounting profession; (3) be funded by
congressionally-levied

fees;97

(4)

have procedures

to consider

promptly, by majority vote, needed accounting changes; (5) consider
the need to keep standards current and converge internationally; and
(6) be approved by the SEC based on ability to aid the SEC in
discharging its responsibilities to protect investors under U.S.
securities laws.98

These statutory requirements were nearly tailor-made for FASB,
with one adjustment-shifting from funding by private donation and
product sales to the funding mechanism the statute requires (levies on
95. See SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1.
96. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 7218(b) (2006); Sarbanes-Oxley Act
§ 109.
97. This provision requires the body to establish an annual fiscal budget that is
"reviewed and approved according to [its] internal procedures" and is funded by fees
"assessed and collected against each issuer" so as "to pay for the budget and provide for
the expenses of that standard-setting body, and to provide for an independent, stable
source of funding for such body, subject to review by the Commission." Sarbanes-Oxley
Act § 109.
98. The first five of the listed criteria are set forth in Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
§ 108(b)(A)(i)-(v); the sixth listed criterion appears in § 108(b)(1)(B).
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U.S.-listed companies). With that adjustment made, FASB applied to
the SEC for recognition,99 and the SEC approved its application. 100 In
its approval, the SEC noted that such recognition is permitted under
SOX only when a standard-setter is able to assist the SEC in meeting
requirements of U.S. federal securities laws, including by helping to
improve the quality of financial reporting to protect investors under
U.S. law. 101 The SEC opined that FASB's overseer, the Financial
Accounting Foundation ("FAF"), met this and other SOX
requirements. °0
Although IASB adopted governance attributes that the SEC had
suggested in the late 1990s, it lacks or may lack some of the traits that
SOX requires. Of the criteria listed in SOX, IASB clearly meets the
first two-it is a private entity 3 with a majority of trustees
independent of the accounting professions."
Nevertheless, IASB
clearly lacks two others, and it is uncertain whether it meets the
remaining two.

99. See Letter from Robert H. Herz, Chairman, FASB, and Manuel H. Johnson,
Chairman and President, FAF, to Harvey L. Pitt, SEC Chairman (Aug. 16, 2002);
Commission Statement of Policy Reaffirming the Status of the FASB as a Designated
Private-Sector Standard Setter, Securities Act Release No. 8221, Exchange Act Release
No. 47743, Investment Company Act Release No. 26028, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,333, 23,333 n.5
(May 1, 2003), [hereinafter SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming FASB Status], available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/policy/33-8221.htm#p40_5130.
100. SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming FASB Status, supra note 99, at 23,333.
101. Id. at 23,334.
Recognition of standards set by a private sector standard-setting body as
"generally accepted" is only appropriate under Section 108 of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act if, among other things, the Commission determines that the private sector
body "has the capacity to assist the Commission in fulfilling the requirements of
... the Securities Exchange Act ... because, at a minimum, the standard-setting

body is capable of improving the accuracy and effectiveness of financial reporting
and the protection of investors under the securities laws."
Id.
102. Id. at 23,335.
103. The International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation is a private, notfor-profit corporation incorporated in the State of Delaware and is IASB's parent. See
International Accounting Standards Board, About the IASC Foundation,
http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/International+Accounting+Standards+Board+-+About+
Us.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
104. It appears that a majority of the trustees have not been associated with a U.S.
registered public accounting firm for at least two years. The trustees include the current
CEO of PriceWaterhouseCoopers, a retired chairman of Ernst & Young, and a retired
chairman of KPMG Hong Kong. See International Accounting Standards Board, Trustees
of the IASC Foundation, http:l/www.iasb.orglAbout+Us/About+the+Trustees/Trustee+
members.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
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First, SOX requires a simple majority voting rule to approve new
standards, but IASB uses a super majority rule. 105 This is a non-trivial
deviation from SOX requirements. The simple majority voting rule
influences the standard-setting process and the probability that the
body will have the capacity to respond quickly and independently to
emerging accounting issues. The reason SOX included the simple

majority voting rule requirement traces back to debates and changes
over the years in the voting rule that FASB used." 6
Second, IASB is not funded using congressionally-levied fees
required by SOX. Instead, it relies on private donations from a small
number of corporations, auditing firms, and others. 117 Private funding

can create real or apparent conflicts if donors contribute believing the
board will return the favor by passing accounting standards that they
prefer. SOX's funding provision eliminated that problem for FASB.
Thus, establishing independent and stable funding for IASB is vital.

Despite this fundamental point, the SEC seemed at first unaware of
it, and later, indifferent to it. 10

105. Adopting an IFRS requires a vote of at least nine of the fourteen board members,
as does issuing an Exposure Draft, a Standard, or final interpretation; a simple majority at
a meeting is required with at least 60% attending for other decisions, including adding to
the agenda, and publishing a discussion paper. IASC Foundation Constitution 30,
http://www.iasb.org/About+U.S./About+the+Foundation/Constitution.htm
(last visited
Nov. 21, 2008).
106. ROBERT VAN RIPER, SETTING STANDARDS FOR FINANCIAL REPORTING: FASB
AND THE STRUGGLE FOR CONTROL OF A CRITICAL PROCESS 86-87 (1994).
107. See IASB, 2007 ANNUAL REPORT 54-58, available at http://www.iasb.org/
About+Us/About+the+IASC+Foundation/Funding.htm (follow links to "2008 funding
commitments" and "2007 Annual Report").
108. The SEC's first release contains serious errors and omissions concerning how
FASB is funded. It states: "The FASB is overseen by the Financial Accounting
Foundation ("FAF"), which is responsible for funding the activities of the FASB.
SEC Proposed Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 12, at 37,965 (emphasis added).
This is false. The proposal never mentions SOX's funding provisions. In summarizing the
SEC-FASB relationship, the proposal says that the SEC oversees FASB activities,
provides views on member selection, and sometimes refers accounting issues to it, but
never mentions that, under SOX, the SEC reviews FASB's annual budget. Id.; see also
Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 109(e)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 7219(e)(1) (2006). I identified these errors in
a comment letter dated July 10, 2007. See Letter from Lawrence A. Cunningham, George
Washington Univ. Law Sch., to Sec. & Exch. Comm'n 3 n.l (July 10, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-13-07/s71307-3.pdf. The errors were corrected but not
acknowledged in the SEC's next release a month later. See SEC Concept Release on
Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,602 (accurately explaining how FASB is funded). The
errors were also rectified but not acknowledged in the SEC's final rule rescinding the
reconciliation requirement. See SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75,
at 989. In it, the SEC never mentions anything about its authority to recognize IASB
given that IASB lacks attributes that SOX requires. The only reference is a citation to
SOX in the Section requiring a statement of the statutory basis of the rule. Id. at 1008.
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IASB may or may not meet two other SOX criteria. First, it is
uncertain whether IASB promptly considers new standards. It did so
in the early 2000s, 19 and, indeed, for many years, it appeared to do so.
However, after numerous countries and the European Union began
recognizing IFRS, the costs of shifting from national accounting
standards to IFRS appeared daunting to many companies (the costs
would be higher if, during the transition, companies also had to
contend with continuing changes and updates). As a result, IASB
announced a policy to suspend adopting any new standards for a
number of years to facilitate transition.11 °
Second, perhaps the most nettlesome SOX criteria for IASB to
grapple with is SOX's quintessentially domestic character. SOX
requires standard setters to have the capacity to assist the SEC in its
responsibilities by "improving ... the protection of investors under
the securities laws.... That determination is for the SEC to make.
IASB might have the capacity, but this poses a question concerning
whether IASB can commit to protecting investors under U.S.
securities laws. Its mission is to produce standards of general
applicability globally. Being responsive to international needs may
lead IASB to subordinate U.S. needs, including the needs of U.S.
investors. Although it is not impossible that the two objectives are
co-extensive, this cannot be assumed.'1 2 In fact, even the SEC
recognizes its diminished capacity to influence IASB compared to
1 13

FASB.

Two further questions arise in considering whether IASB can
qualify as an accounting standard setter under U.S. securities laws.
The first question concerns whether the SEC is authorized to delegate
such powers to more than one body. It appears that this is possible,
but this conclusion is not obvious. " 4 On the one hand, recognizing
109. See International Accounting Standards Board, No New IFRSs Effective Until
2009,
http://www.iasb.org/About+Us/About+IASB/No+new+major+standards+to+be+
effective+before+2009.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
110. Id.
111. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(b), 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2006).
112. The challenge is suggested by the issues canvassed in the next Part concerning the
varying corporate, financial, and investor cultures in the world.
See infra text
accompanying notes 148-201. The SEC provides no public analysis of these concerns.
113. See SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 1007 ("We
recognize that our relationship with the IASB is less direct than our relationship with the
FASB and that there are more and varied constituents of the IASB than of the FASB.
The result may be that our view will be one of many views that the IASB receives from
around the world and considers when developing future standards.").
114. That is the SEC's interpretation of SOX. See SEC Policy Statement Reaffirming
FASB Status, supra note 99 ("The Act does not restrict the Commission's ability to
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multiple standard setters could present reconciliation and conflict
risks among competing standards. If so, then any number of potential
standard setters can vie for SEC recognition, but the SEC ultimately
would designate one. On the other hand, allowing recognition of
multiple standard setters could be appealing if competition among
them is desirable. ' Companies would simply declare which body's
standards they are using. Alas, SOX's text is unclear on whether to
prefer competition to comparability.
The second question concerns whether the SEC is authorized to
delegate powers to bodies even if they lack the stated criteria. The
SEC claims this authority. ' 6 But an elementary analysis of the
statutory language and purpose concludes that the SEC's position is
untenable.' 7 The statute provides that the SEC "may recognize, as
'generally accepted,' for purposes of the securities laws, any
accounting principles established by a standard setting body" that
possesses the stated attributes." 8 The statute adds: "Nothing in this
Act ...shall be construed to impair or limit the authority of the

develop accounting principles on its own, and does not limit the number of private-sector
bodies the Commission may recognize."). The statute is not as obvious as this
interpretation suggests. SOX Section 108(b)(1) directs that the SEC may recognize as
generally accepted any accounting principles established by "a standard setting body"
meeting stated criteria. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 108(b)(1) (emphasis added). This
suggests that any number of standard setters can vie for the SEC's blessing. However,
Section 109, which contains funding provisions, refers repeatedly to "the standard setting
body referred to in ...[section 108]." §§ 109(c)(1), 109(e), 109(f), 109(g) (emphasis
added). The definitive article suggests that there shall be one SEC-designated accounting
standard-setter.
115. See supranote 92 and accompanying text.
116. See SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supranote 1, at 45,602 (after noting
that the SEC has historically relied on FASB and predecessors to generate accounting
standards, stating that the securities laws, including SOX, "provide the [SEC] with the
authority to set accounting standards") (citing § 108(c)). The SEC sought public comment
on the following question in SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at
45,605. It asked whether it would "make a difference" if the SEC "officially recognized
the accounting principles established by the IASB." To "officially recognize" presumably
refers to formal anointment of IASB as a sanctioned standard setter for purposes of U.S.
securities laws. This implicates issues associated with the different relationships the SEC
has with IASB and FASB, including the SEC's statutory authority to recognize IASB,
which the SEC blithely ignores.
117. The issue of the SEC's power is more than a legal quarrel. Even if the
accompanying analysis were incorrect and the SEC has the power, there is sufficient doubt
that it would be a factor in any company's decision to opt for IFRS (for companies given
the option). What weight this legal uncertainty should be given and its relative role in any
decision will vary across companies. But it likely would be decisive in a meaningful
portion of cases.
118. Sarbanes-Oxley Act § 108(b)(1) 15 U.S.C. § 77s (2006).
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Commission to establish accounting principles or standards for
'
purposes of enforcement of the securities laws."119

The SEC appears to believe that this latter provision means it
can recognize standard setters not meeting the criteria stated in the
former. A more faithful reading of the literal language is that the
latter provision reserves pre-existing SEC authority to establish
accounting standards, and the former narrowly addresses its power to
delegate that authority to others. This reading of the literal language
is strengthened by a purposive understanding. The stated attributes
express public policy values that would be rendered meaningless
under the SEC's interpretation. 120 It is fortified by observing how
SEC delegation to IASB would represent a non-trivial relinquishment
of U.S. sovereignty to an international non-governmental

organization.
3. Systemic Implications
Numerous additional changes would be required, regardless of

an optional or mandatory move to IFRS, and assuming SEC authority
to accept IFRS. These adjustments are necessary because the entire
U.S. system assumes a single set of accounting standards-U.S.
GAAP.

Unfortunately, the SEC pays scant attention to many of

these systemic implications.
a. Non-SEC Entities
The SEC's vision is dominated by the twelve thousand or so

public companies subject to its jurisdiction. Yet the vast majority of
U.S. enterprises, numbering some twelve million, are not public
companies.121 U.S. GAAP is the standard way that many of these
119. Id. § 108(c).
120. There is another curiosity about the language of non-limitation. It says nothing in
SOX shall "limit the authority of the Commission to establish accounting principles or
standards for purposes of enforcement of the securities laws." Sarbanes-Oxley § 108(b)(1)
(emphasis added). This is ambiguous. The concept of enforcement could be read
narrowly to address the specific context of SEC enforcement proceedings or broadly to
capture the general context of implementing the overall system of securities regulation.
The narrow reading would mean that other provisions, including the standard setter
recognition provision, could limit the SEC's plenary powers to produce accounting
standards ex ante. This seems unlikely. The broader reading would reserve the SEC's
plenary powers while still curtailing its power to delegate.
121. Relatively recent census bureau data classifying firms by the dollar amount of
receipts is suggestive, showing many millions of smaller business in the United States and
a relative minority of very large businesses. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistics About
Business Size, tbl. 3, http://www.census.gov/epcd/www/smallbus.html#RcptSize (last
visited Nov. 21, 2008).
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millions of companies prepare financial statements. Thus, movement
to IFRS jeopardizes the continuing production of U.S. GAAP. Plans
must be made either to continue to have FASB or another body
produce U.S. GAAP or to facilitate a move to IFRS by all private
companies. Continuing with U.S. GAAP production for use by
private companies would raise the cost to those companies going
public. But moving all companies to IFRS incurs the costs of a
general transition. The SEC has not analyzed this problem, but
instead, only asked for public comment on how recognizing IFRS
would affect FASB. 22
b. Other Entities
Many U.S. companies are subject to special regulations or
requirements that are tied expressly to U.S. GAAP, including
financial institutions and public utilities and railroads. 123
For
example, the standard rules concerning capitalized interest are
changed for regulated enterprises,'124 and the Interstate Commerce
Commission supplies non-GAAP accounting depreciation principles
for railroad investments in track.'25 All related regulations would
require adjustment. Like the issue detailed above, the SEC does not
analyze these issues but only asks for public comment on whether
they would pose barriers to adopting IFRS.12 6
c. Tax Policy
Some important parts of U.S. tax policy are linked to U.S.
GAAP. Thus, a switch to IFRS requires adjusting them. Many of
these policies appear in the Internal Revenue Code. A principal
example is its Last In/First Out ("LIFO") conformity rule, 27 which
requires companies to use, for tax reporting, the same inventory
convention they use for financial reporting. The SEC does not
1 28
analyze these matters.
122. See SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,603.
123. See LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, LAW AND ACCOUNTING: CASES AND
MATERIALS 677-90 (2005) (presenting U.S. GAAP excerpts of specialized standards for
music, cable TV, title companies, railroads, public utilities, oil and gas, insurance, and
financial institutions).
124. Id. at 682.
125. Id. at 680-81.
126. See SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,603
(demonstrating, at question 6, the SEC's invitation for public comments).
127. See I.R.C. § 472(c) (2006).
128. Other examples of tax provisions that rely heavily on provisions of U.S. GAAP
are those concerning the deductability of bad debt expenses and of executive
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d. Contracts
Numerous private contracts that enterprises have in place use
GAAP heavily, especially the ratios contained in debt agreements
and triggers contained in compensation agreements. 129 All these must
be adjusted to conform to IFRS. This is not a simple matter of
amending references to GAAP to become IFRS references. The
measurements under the two systems may differ such that specific
ratios and calculations require reconsideration and, in the case of
some contracts, renegotiation. Nor does the SEC analyze these
issues. Instead, it simply seeks public comment on whether they pose
barriers to adopting IFRS. 13 °
e. Affected Regulations
Numerous SEC regulations are intertwined with U.S. GAAP in
ways that would differ under IFRS. For example, consider safe
harbors for forward-looking information. Under U.S. law, forwardlooking disclosure is presented outside the audited financial
statements and is insulated from liability risk by various legislative,
regulatory, and judicial doctrines."' Under IFRS, however, these are
included as part of the audited financial statements and therefore are

compensation. See I.R.C. § 166(a)(2) ("When satisfied that a debt is recoverable only in
part, the Secretary may allow such debt, in an amount not in excess of the part charged off
within the taxable year, as a deduction."); I.R.C. §§ 162(m)(1) & (3)(B) (limiting
deductions of compensation paid to employees whose "total compensation ... is required
to be reported to shareholders under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 by reason of
such employee being among the 4 highest compensated officers for the taxable year").
129. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Sharing Accounting's Burden: Business Lawyers
in Enron's Dark Shadows, 57 Bus. LAW 1421, 1435 (2002); Robert M. Lloyd, Financial
Covenants in Commercial Loan Documentation: Uses and Limitations, 58 TENN. L. REV.
335, 341-42 (1991).
130. See SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,603 (showing the
SEC seeking, at question 6, public comment).
131. See, e.g., Securities Act of 1933 § 27A, 15 U.S.C. § 77z-2 (2006) (restricting liability
for cautionary language in forward-looking statements); Securities Exchange Act of 1934
§ 21E, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-5(c) (2006) (same); Harris v. Ivax Corp., 182 F.3d 799, 803 (11th
Cir. 1999) (discussing changes to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 that protect
forward-looking statements later proved to be false if the statements are accompanied
with meaningful cautionary statements); Rubinstein v. Collins, 20 F.3d 160, 167 (5th Cir.
1994) (citing other cases that discuss the "bespeaks caution" doctrine); In re Donald J.
Trump Casino SEC. Litig., 7 F.3d 357, 364 (3d Cir. 1993) (discussing the "bespeaks
caution" doctrine); Mayer v. Mylod, 988 F.2d 635, 639 (6th Cir. 1993) (stating that the use
of cautionary language in disclosures may prevent liability); Securities Act Rule 175, 17
C.F.R. § 230.175 (2006) (same); Exchange Act Rule 3b-6, 17 C.F.R. § 240.3b-6 (2008)
(same).
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not automatically subject to the same insulating doctrines.13
A
broader set of examples are the form and content provisions of
Regulation S-X,'33 including Item 305, and the concept of and
limitations on the use of non-GAAP measures in financial disclosure.
All these require amendment, which the SEC effected when adopting
its final rule rescinding reconciliation for foreign private issuers.'
f Substantive Variations
Important areas exist where the difference between U.S. GAAP
and IFRS is stark. A leading example concerns accounting by
investment companies, especially mutual funds. U.S. GAAP contains
an elaborate, industry-specific standard for this accounting, which
highlights a schedule of investments, calculation of net asset values,
determination of brokerages fees, and treats the residual interest in
the fund as owners' equity.135
FRS presents all these matters in
entirely different ways, or does not require the related presentation at
all.' 36 A second example is the treatment of insurance contracts.
This, too, is an elaborate and well-developed body of accounting
under U.S. GAAP, but receives limited and conflicting treatment
under IFRS. 13 7 The SEC recognizes such examples and expresses
confidence that IASB will address them in the future.'38
132. This uncertainty appears to be particularly relevant to forward-looking disclosure
concerning derivative financial instruments under IFRS No. 7. See, e.g., SEC Final Rule
Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 996-97 (noting the absence of a requirement
for forward-looking statements in audited financial statements under IFRS No. 7).
133. Id. at 999-1001.
134. See SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 994-1002; see
also SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,609 (discussing
conforming adjustments to Regulation S-X, investment company accounting, Regulation
S-K, and other SEC pronouncements on accounting matters). Other SEC regulations
require adjustment to address the transition period between ending use of U.S. GAAP
and beginning use of IFRS. A leading example is how SEC regulations call for providing
five years of historical summary financial data. When a company begins to report under
IFRS, it will not have five years of IFRS history to report, and the GAAP history it has
will not necessarily be comparable.
135. See SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,607-08.
136. Id.
137. See SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 997.
Surprisingly, a comprehensive but brief list of differences between IFRS and U.S. GAAP
does not appear to exist. In conducting research necessary to prepare one, the author can
report only one source offering the beginnings for such a list. See Barry J. Epstein, CPA,
IFRA vs. GAAP, http://www.ifrsaccounting.com/ifrs-gaap.html (citing and providing
tabular form information from BARRY J. EPSTEIN & EVA K. JERMAKOWICZ, WILEY
IMRS 2008, INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL
REPORTING STANDARDS, Appendix C, (2008)).
138. See SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 998; SEC
Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,607-08.
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g. Training and Education
An underappreciated issue is the scarcity of U.S. expertise in
IFRS. For generations in the U.S., GAAP has been the basis for

training, education, and examination of accountants, both in schools
and in practice. Conversely, IFRS is barely known and rarely taught.

Thus, the entire U.S. training, education, and examination system
requires revision. This retraining extends to most auditing firms
(some larger ones report possessing knowledge of IMRS), regulators
(including the SEC), colleges and universities (few courses exist and
none are required), and investors (only sophisticated internationalist
investors have exposure to IFRS). The SEC recognizes this limitation
but expressly assumes that, if the SEC leads the way on IFRS,
training and education will follow.139
h. Auditing Concentration
Only the largest auditing firms claim to command any significant
knowledge of IFRS.
Smaller firms have comparatively fewer

resources to make an immediate and significant investment in
requisite training. This creates the possibility that moving to IFRS
could increase the competitive advantage that larger firms enjoy
compared to smaller ones. At present, the four largest firms dwarf
the size of the next largest firms by a considerable ratio.1 4° The
139. See SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 991
(acknowledging limited knowledge in IFRS and then stating: "We anticipate, however,
that by encouraging the use of IFRS as issued by the IASB, these amendments will help
investors to understand international investment opportunities more clearly and with
greater comparability in the long-term than if they had to continue to rely on a multiplicity
of national accounting standards."); SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note
1, at 45,607 ("The use of FRS by U.S. issuers would create the need for effective training
and education." (emphasis added)); id. ("The education of most accountants in the United
States ... does not include a ... curriculum around IFRS....

Consequently, all parties

would likely need to undertake comprehensive training on IFRS.").
140. The websites of the four largest firms-Deloitte, E&Y, KPMG, and PWC-report
annual revenue ranging from $19.8 billion to $28.2 billion. See Deloitte, Facts & Figures,
(last visited
http://www.deloitte.com/dtt/sectionnode/0,1042,sid%253D147431,00.html
Nov. 21, 2008); Press Release, Ernst & Young, Ernst & Young Fiscal Year 2008 Global
to US$24.5 Billion (Oct. 7, 2008), available at
Revenues Rise 16.2%
http://www.ey.com/global/content.nsf/International/Media---Press-Release---Ernst_&_
Young__fiscal-year_2008_globalrevenues-rise toUS$25_billion; Press Release, KPMG,
KPMG 2007 Global Revenues Grow 17.4% to US$19.8 Billion (Nov. 29, 2007), available
at http://www.kpmg.com.au/Default.aspx?TablD=214&KPMGArticleltemlD=2796; Press
Release, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, PriceWaterhouseCoopers 2008 Revenues Rose 8% to
(Oct. 1, 2008), available at http://www.pwc.com/extweb/
US$28.2 Billion
The next largest
ncpressrelease.nsf/docid/31479FE5AF3412CF852574D4005641AA.
firms-BDO Seidman and Grant Thornton-report revenue ranging up to $1.2 billion.
See Press Release, BDO Seidman, LLP, BDO Seidman, LLP Announces Strong Revenue
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industry is moderately concentrated under traditional antitrust law
analysis.'
Accordingly, a shift to IFRS could, at least in the short
term, increase this concentration. The SEC does not dwell on these
matters. Instead, it asks what role auditing firms can play in
promoting comparability in IFRS applications.
i. Responsiveness

The shift to IFRS would involve a significant reduction in the
ability of U.S. constituents to influence accounting standard setting.
Professional or trade associations, such as the American Bankers
Association, now regularly interact with FASB to exchange
knowledge relevant to the production of standards.'42
This
opportunity will be diminished given that IASB will have many more
constituents and is located abroad.'4 3 The SEC does not analyze these
matters.
j. Investor Protection

The combination of reduced U.S. sovereignty, increased use of
principles, and concomitant adjustments (some noted above and
many others elaborated below) will diminish U.S. investor protection
traditions. True, increasing global capital flows should reduce the
costs of capital and increase returns to investors, which, in turn, can
create a wider spectrum of investment opportunities from which to
choose, adding to the possibility of portfolio diversification, risk
management, and risk-adjusted returns.
To the extent that
comparability is achieved, these benefits would be real. But, there
are risks that comparability will be limited. The most significant risk
is that uniform standards coupled with official, if rhetorical, SEC talk

Growth for 2008 (July 28, 2008), availableat http://www.bdo.com/news/pr/846 (announcing
revenues for fiscal year 2008 at $659 million); Press Release, Grant Thornton, Grant
Thornton LLP Revenues Rise to $1.2 Billion (Oct. 28, 2008), available at
http://www.grantthornton.com/porta/site/gtcom/menuitem.550794734a67d883a5f2ba40633
841ca/?vgnextoid=c8f3f99677e3dllOVgnVCM1000003a8314acRCRD&vgnextchannel=f51
ecbbdad9c4OlOVgnVCM100000368314acRCRD.
141. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUBLIC ACCOUNTING FIRMS: MANDATED
STUDY ON CONSOLIDATION AND COMPETITION 18-20 (2003).
142. See Letter from American Bankers Ass'n to SEC (Nov. 27, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-20-07/s72007-89.pdf (commenting on the SEC Concept
Release on Domestic IFRS).
143. Various solutions to this issue are readily imaginable, including creating regional
IASB offices around the world (at present, three would be sufficient, in Asia, Europe, and
North America, although consideration should be given to include South America and
eventually Africa).
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of comparability will produce a veneer of uniformity and
comparability, disguising significant differences in practice.
The SEC offers only modest references to investor interests or
investor protection. It repeatedly emphasizes increased cross-border
capital flows as benefits from moving to IFRS with token recognition
144
that achieving those benefits may also benefit or protect investors.
Additionally, the SEC's asserted benefits for investors often are
strained. For example, it says that companies using IFRS will enjoy
savings from financial reporting activities, thus freeing up funds for
them to invest in productive business activity. 145 That, the SEC says,
will benefit investors. Somewhat ironically, the SEC proceeds with its
proposals based on the strength of supportive comment letters from
many non-investors and in spite of opposition or skepticism expressed
by numerous investors.'4 6
Unfortunately, this limited SEC attention to investor interests in
the context of accounting standards introduces another paradox and
contradiction. Federal statutes require the SEC, in its rule-making
and policy formulation, to balance goals of investor protection and
144. See, e.g., SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 1008 (noting
that the rule promotes efficiency, competition, and capital formation and stating that "[w]e
believe that investors would have adequate information on which to base investment
decisions and that capital may be allocated on a more efficient basis"); SEC Concept
Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,600 ("The Commission has long advocated
reducing disparity between the accounting and disclosure practices of the United States
and other countries as a means to facilitate cross-border capital formation while providing
adequate disclosure for the protection of investors and the promotion of fair, orderly and
efficient markets.") (emphasis added); SEC Proposed Rule Rescinding Reconciliation,
supra note 12, at 37,965 ("The Commission has long advocated reducing disparity between
the accounting and disclosure practices of the United States and other countries as a
means to facilitate cross-border capital formation while ensuring adequate disclosure for
the protection of investors and the promotion of fair, orderly and efficient markets."
(emphasis added)); SEC Proposed Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 12, at
37,967 ("The Commission has encouraged movement towards a single set of high-quality
globally accepted accounting standards as an important goal both for the protection of
investors and the efficiency of capital markets.").
145. See, e.g., SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 1006
(asserting that issuers save money by preparing statements in IFRS and arguing that
investors will benefit from these savings); SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra
note 1, at 45,603 (stating that, if an issuer saves money by preparing statements in IFRS
instead of U.S. GAAP and allocates the savings to higher earning opportunities without
incurring an "increase in the cost of its capital as a result of using IFRS, investors will
benefit in terms of a better rate of return").
146. See SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 987
("[C]ommenters supporting the proposal ... included many foreign private issuers,
accounting firms, legal firms and foreign standard setters, as well as some investors ... ");
id. (noting that the views of other commentators, including some institutional investors
and rating agencies, "were mixed").
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capital formation.147 Congress gives the SEC limited guidance on
balancing these goals, granting discretion to the changing SEC
leadership. On the other hand, in SOX, Congress explicitly directed
how the balance is to be struck concerning accounting standards. It
told the SEC to consider, when evaluating a standard setter, whether
the standard setter has the ability to assist the SEC in discharging its
responsibility to protect investors. 14 8 Accordingly, when the SEC
elevates capital formation above investor protection as a rationale to
embrace IFRS and IASB, it contradicts this legislative directive.
All these complex matters may be manageable but, at the very
least, pose risks. The SEC considers some risks, but it offers limited
evaluation of many important ones, such as investor protection. Each
of these domestic challenges, moreover, resides in a broader
international framework that presents substantive and structural
challenges. The challenges require further probing, something that
the SEC likewise has failed to undertake with requisite rigor.
Substantively, these matters raise issues about the character,
purposes, and interpretation of accounting standards, issues the SEC
has essentially ignored. Structurally, these matters raise practical
issues of production, enforcement, and compliance. The SEC has
discussed these issues, but its analysis and plans appear more
idealistic than realistic. The following two Parts explore these
respective substantive and structural challenges before assessing the
prospects of achieving universal accounting.
II. SUBSTANTIVE CHALLENGES

Many national or regional features influence accounting systems
used in various countries. These features are converging. Accounting
is both following suit and likely to reinforce and hasten convergence.
Still, while some features are likely to be more resistant to change
than others, all are relevant to the probable success and required
shape of global accounting standard production and form. The
following discussion uses familiar classifications from corporate law
scholarship to highlight aspects of accounting that are affected by
national variation posing substantive challenges to a successful
universal system of global accounting. Although the SEC says little
147. See 15 U.S.C. § 77b(b) (2006).
148. See supra text accompanying notes 97-120 (discussing SOX-mandated attributes
of an accounting standard-setter, including ability to help the SEC protect investors).
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or nothing about such substantive challenges, they present
considerable obstacles to any existing or potential SEC vision, be it
one designed to promote comparability or one to encourage effective
competition.
A.

Legal Origins

National accounting systems are connected to local legal
traditions. A broad contrast among legal traditions distinguishes
common law and civil law.149 Accounting standards in common law
countries, such as the United States and United Kingdom,
traditionally obtained authority through general acceptance by the
profession; 10 accounting systems in civil law countries, including most
continental European countries (the Netherlands is the major
exception), obtain legitimacy by enactment as law.15' Japanese
accounting exhibited a blending of these traditions. 2 These legal
origins explain some of the observed and persistent divergence
among companies purporting to use IFRS, as discussed earlier.'53
These origins also play out in different views on how to apply
identical accounting requirements. A salient manifestation of how
legal origins influence the application of identical accounting
requirements concerns the principle that financial statements should
present a true and fair view of the business and financial condition of
an enterprise. This edict, perhaps the most famously flexible and
contingent notion in all of accounting, can mean different things in
different contexts and cultures.
Substantive disagreements exist concerning the relationship
between the principle and other accounting standards. The issue
arises when applying the standards could impair the objective. Three
stances appear. 54 In the United Kingdom, an override is required so
149. See Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, Legal Origins, 117 Q. J. ECON. 1193,

1193-97 (2002) (analyzing the differences between common and civil law traditions);
Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, The Economic
Consequences of Legal Origins,46 J. ECON. LITERATURE 285, 285-87 (2007) (synthesizing

extensive research on relationships between national legal origins and regulatory
provisions and economic outcomes).
150. This is also true for Dutch accounting, despite a civil law tradition, and due in part
to its use of a specialized commercial and company law court. See MILLER EUROPEAN
ACCOUNTING GUIDE 700 (David Alexander & Simon Archer eds., 3d ed. 1998).
151. Id. at 1-2.
152. Id. at 1,149.

153. The evidence summarized above attributed variation among IFRS users to
different legal origins. See supra text accompanying notes 72-74.
154. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Semiotics, Hermeneutics, and Cash: An Essay on
the True and Fair View, 28 N.C. J. INT'L & COM. REG. 893, 902-13 (2003).
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that the true and fair view is privileged and conflicting standards are
ignored; in Europe, overriding the written rules is repugnant, despite
the "true and fair" view concept; and in the United States, overrides
have generally not been used because litigation risks induce people to
comply with rules.'55 It appears unlikely that any international
standard will be capable of reconciling these disagreements. After all,
local cultural influences will retain a role in how the principle is
applied.
This skepticism is reinforced by observing how diverse efforts to
define "true and fair view" show a struggle suggesting cultural
contingencies. For example, in England, "fair" denotes that reports
are within a range of fidelity to business records and economic reality;
"true" negates its opposite-false.'56 But, until the United Kingdom
joined the European Union, the concept of "true and fair" was alien
to non-Dutch Europe; the European Union's 1978 Fourth Directive
introduced the requirement. 57 The Italian translation of "true and
fair" is "true and correct" (rappresentare in modo veritiero e
corretto),158 which is then equated with Italian civil law requiring
"straightforwardness and truth" (evidenza a verita).59
Many

translations replace the compound phrase with a single word. In
Greece, this is the equivalent of "real"; in Belgium, France,
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Spain, it is the equivalent of
"faithful."'" In the United States, the concept is embedded in the
requirement that financial statements "fairly present" an enterprise's
financial condition and results of operations. 6 '
B.

Securities Regulation

Legal traditions continue to influence the shape of securities
regulation in different countries. Securities regulation, in turn,
155. Id. at 908-09.
156. Alternatively, "true" is defined as complying with the letter of rules and "fair" as
complying with the spirit of rules. Tom K. Cowan, Are Truth and Fairness Generally
Acceptable?, 40 ACCT. REV. 788,788-94 (1965).
157. See Cunningham, supra note 154.
158. In earlier legislation, Italy translated the phrase as "faithful picture" (quadro
fedele). See MILLER EUROPEAN ACCOUNTING GUIDE, supra note 150, at 581.
159. Id. at 583 (citing Civil Code, Article 2217, section 2). Italian accounting also
requires true and correct presentation with clarity and precision (chiarezza e precisione).
Id. (citing Civil Code, Article 2423, section 2).
160. See Christopher Nobes, The True and Fair View Requirement: Impact on and of
the Fourth Directive, 24 AccT. & Bus. RES. 35, 42 (1993). Similar translation differences
exist across Europe, such as right-looking (Denmark), according to facts (the
Netherlands), and true and appropriate (Portugal). Id.
161. See Cunningham, supra note 154, at 902-13.

2008]

THE SEC'S GLOBAL ACCOUNTING VISION

influences accounting standards. The most forceful examples of these
relationships appear in the contexts of investor protection and
enforcement intensity. 62 In the United States, investor protection is
among the principal purposes of securities regulation, and accounting
principles are designed to bolster investor protection. 6 3 In many
other countries, interests of constituencies other than investors
matter, and investor protection is one among several competing goals
of securities regulation. 164 Enforcement intensity refers to the relative
strength of legal institutions equipped to police adherence to
securities regulations, including accounting provisions. 165 The United
States employs an intense enforcement apparatus, one that includes
the SEC, private litigation, and various other state and federal
authorities. 166 Few other countries match this level of enforcement
intensity, and many exhibit a weak enforcement apparatus. 67
These differences pose implications for a range of accounting
issues. A general example concerns the preferred form that standards
assume, ranging from detailed rules to vague principles. Indeed, it is
possible to understand the relative rules-density of U.S. GAAP as a
product of an intensive enforcement environment. 168 Thus, litigation
threats may lead preparers and auditors to value clarity in accounting
standards, leading to extensive provision of detailed guidance. 69
Unlike U.S. companies, European and Asian companies and
constituents may be able to accept relatively more generic accounting
standards, in part because of the comparatively lower level of private
and public enforcement of securities laws through regulation,
enforcement, and litigation.
162. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Law and the Market: The Impact of Enforcement, 156 U.
PA. L. REV. 229, 230-34 (2007) (exploring the impact of high-intensity securities
enforcement in the United States); see also Howell E. Jackson, Variation in the Intensity of
Financial Regulation: Preliminary Evidence and Potential Implications, 24 YALE J. ON
REG. 253, 279-85 (2007) (noting variations in intensity of financial regulation in different
countries).
163.

See THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION 9-10 (5th ed.

2005).
164. Id. at 17-19.
165. See Jackson, supra note 162, at 278-79.
166. Id. at 279.
167. The issue of required enforcement in a global accounting environment is
considered more extensively in Part III's evaluation of structural challenges presented by
the shift to a universal accounting system. See infra text accompanying notes 248-59.
168. See George J. Benston, Public (U.S.) Compared to Private (U.K.) Regulation of
Corporate FinancialDisclosure, 51 AcCt. REV. 483, 484-85 (1976); Stephen A. Zeff, A
Perspective on the U.S. Public/Private-SectorApproach to the Regulation of Financial
Reporting,9 Accr. HORIZONS 52, 66 (1995).
169. See Cunningham, supra note 51, at 1473 nn.266-68.
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Predicting the effects of cultural variance on the future of IFRS is
not easy. It is conceivable that relative enforcement intensity and the
value of investor protection can converge worldwide. That would
mean making legal changes to U.S. regulations in order to reduce the
role of liability risk and litigation threats on preparers and auditors.
These changes would curtail demand for detail or increase those
levers in other nations. Both prospects entail momentous changes
with uncertain prospects and payoffs. Even substantial reductions in
the scope of legal liability for accounting violations are unlikely to
eliminate litigation as a dispute resolution mechanism in the United
States.17° Intensifying enforcement activity in other countries is
possible but is by no means certain or desirable.17'
C.

Corporate Governance

Corporate governance, referring to the combination of corporate
purpose and organizational arrangements designed to achieve it,
varies worldwide. Broadly defined, corporate purposes range from a
shareholder profit maximization philosophy to a pluralistic
conception of corporate constituencies that includes shareholders,
creditors, employees, suppliers, communities, and the state.172
Organizational arrangements reflect these purposes through devices
such as the design, composition, and duties of boards of directors.
Boards may have one or two tiers, members may be elected by
shareholders only or by other groups, and duties may range from
maximizing profits to assuring the corporation's long-term
sustainability. Accounting in systems characterized by shareholder
profit maximization may naturally emphasize the measurement of
profit from period to period, whereas more pluralistic systems may
emphasize net worth and consistent levels of profit over time.
In addition, the role of employees, at both the senior executive
levels and the broader level of laborers, can have significant effects on
170. An additional explanation for the relatively greater use of principles in IFRS is
simply its relative youth. Repeated application of even the vaguest standard reduces that
vagueness. A maturing IFRS can be expected to metamorphose from principles to rules.
171. The SEC addresses, to a limited extent, concerns arising from certain aspects of
securities regulation. But its focus is not on variation in enforcement intensity or relative
importance of investor protection in different countries. Instead, the SEC's focus on
securities regulation issues is on the challenge of coordinating global authorities to enforce
accounting standards among the world's varying systems. This daunting challenge is
discussed in Section III.B below.
172. In Germany, to give a well-known example, short-term profits are subordinated to
long-term financial survival. See Wolfgang Ballwieser, Germany: IndividualAccounts, in
2 TRANSNATIONAL ACCOUNTING 1241 (Dieter Ordelheide & KPMG eds., 2d ed. 2001).
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accounting philosophy. Labor plays an active role in corporate
governance in many countries, a role rarely held in the United
States.1 73 For example, employees
are formally represented on
174
boards of directors in Germany.
For senior executives, the most pronounced global difference
concerns levels and forms of compensation. U.S. corporations pay
executives considerably greater compensation than elsewhere, often
by staggering multiples and often in the form of stock options and
other compensation that is contingent on varying measures of
corporate performance.1 75 Thus, setting the benchmarks of corporate
performance and calculating compensation levels play a more
important role in accounting systems such as in the United States
than in other systems. However, such benchmarks assume less or no
importance where executive compensation packages are more
modest.

176

In the most general terms, the varying corporate purposes and
organizational designs around the world reflect varying forms of
capitalism. 77 National accounting traditionally reflects competing
conceptions of capitalism. Although these and other distinctive
traditions are converging, enduring diversity in views on capitalism
are likely to continue to exert influence at national levels, posing
challenge to the formulation, acceptance, application, and
17
enforcement of international standards.
D. CorporateFinance
Even within corporate governance systems that exhibit family
resemblance, there may be differences in corporate finance that lead
to sharply different conceptions of accounting's purpose and
audience.
Corporate finance refers to the sources of capital
employed to fund a corporation and the corporation's resulting
173. See Brett H. McDonnell, The Curious Incident of the Workers in the Boardroom,
29 HOFSTRA L. REV. 503, 513 (2000) (book review).
174. Id. at 515.
175. See Charles M. Yablon, Bonus Questions: Executive Compensation in the Era of
Pay for Performance,75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 271, 279-81 (1999).
176. This difference may explain how difficult it was for FASB to adopt accounting
standards requiring the expensing of stock options compared to the IASB's much swifter

adoption of such standards.
177. See generally David Levi-Faur, The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism,
598 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 12 (2005) (discussing varieties of capitalism and

aspects of convergence).
178.

See generally CORPORATE

GOVERNANCE

REGIMES:

CONVERGENCE

AND

DIVERSITY (Joseph A. McCahery et al. eds., 2002) (stating that globally diverse views on

capitalism pose a challenge to the creation of international standards).
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capital structure. The chief categories of capital are equity and debt
securities. The combination, identity, and role that the two forms of
investment play influence the audience for whom accounting is
designed. 79
Needs and interests of debt and equity investors differ. For
equity investors, accounting standards and statements should be
useful to form judgments concerning business value. 80 Standards
quality is evaluated in terms of the relationship between reported
accounting figures and resulting stock market prices or returns. On
the other hand, for debt investors, accounting standards should make
contract negotiation more efficient. Standards quality is evaluated in
terms of whether they translate into financial statements that are
useful for establishing covenants and other contractual provisions that
regulate the rights and duties of lenders and borrowers.
Corporate finance characteristics also influence the relative
importance of transparency that accounting can provide. AngloAmerican finance is oriented toward equity and open capital markets,
often attracting dispersed and uninvolved equity owners, making
transparency in financial reporting vital. 1 ' Traditionally, EuroJapanese finance relies on banks, which exercise considerable power
within corporations.'82 This reduces the importance of reporting
transparency for external users.
The relative needs of equity or debt investors also bear on how
accounting standards and statements address uncertainty. The
traditional U.S. approach to uncertainty is conservatism, meaning
asymmetric recognition of losses compared to gains.'83 However,
investors and other constituencies may have different demands for
relative conservatism. In general, debt demands greater conservatism
than equity."8 Managers compensated heavily using stock options or
179. The list of potential audiences for accounting information can be extended beyond
debt and equity investors to include regulators, vendors, tax authorities, management, and
potential merger partners.
180. See Ray Ball, Ashok Robin & Gil Sadka, Is Accounting Conservatism Due to Debt
or Share Markets? A Test of "Contracting" Versus "Value Relevance" Theories of
Accounting 1 (Feb. 27, 2005), available at http://faculty.chicagogsb.edu/ray.ball/research/
Papers/Is%20Conservatism%2ODue%20to%2ODebt%20or%20Equity%20Markets%202
005-02-27.pdf.
181. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Commonalities and Prescriptions in the Vertical
Dimension of Global CorporateGovernance,84 CORNELL L. REV. 1133, 1136-39 (1999).
182. Id. at 1142.
183. See Sudipta Basu, The Conservatism Principleand the Asymmetric Timeliness of
Earnings,24 J.ACCT. & ECON. 3, 7-8 (1997).
184. See William W. Bratton, Shareholder Value and Auditor Independence, 53 DUKE
L.J. 439, 477 (2003) (debt investors prefer conservative accounting because they do not
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other devices based on reported accounting results will demand a

different level of conservatism than managers not so compensated.
Managerial demand for conservatism relative to that demanded of
equity or debt investors will differ accordingly.

Corporate finance also can influence the relative weight one
assigns to the income statement or balance sheet. This sometimes
follows from the traditional forms of capital structure that prevail. To

the extent that debt capital dominates, the balance sheet assumes
greater importance to provide a basis for estimating solvency; where

equity capital dominates, the income statement warrants a more
central role in evaluating business performance. It is also possible for
the relationship between financial and tax reporting (and the role of
the state) to influence the relative importance of, and the relationship

between, the income statement and the balance sheet. Accounting
for inventory illustrates both points.
It is conceptually defensible to assume that goods in inventory
are sold either in the direct order that they are produced (first-in-

first-out, or "FIFO") or in reverse order of production (last-in-firstout, or "LIFO"). In a period of rising prices, FIFO is more faithful to
economic reality in the balance sheet, because it lists the inventory
assets at more current values; conversely, LIFO is more faithful to

economic reality in the income statement, because it records the costs
of goods sold at more current costs.185 U.S. GAAP permits choosing

between these measurements, allowing enterprises to determine
whether balance sheet or income statement fidelity is more
important, while IFRS requires using FIFO, suggesting balance sheet

primacy.

enjoy capital appreciation and so concentrate on negative analysis of default risk and rely
on hard assets for ultimate recovery).
185. During periods of rising prices, FIFO presents inventory costs on the balance sheet
more accurately by recording it at current costs but presents expenses on the income
statement less accurately, because it does not match current costs of goods sold (COGS) with
current sales (COGS are based on the costs of the oldest items in inventory, while sales are
being made and reported at current prices). As such, during inflationary periods FIFO tends
to understate COGS and report artificially high profit. In contrast, LIFO is generally more
accurate on the income statement (it reflects current COGS) and less accurate on the
balance sheet (it reflects historical inventory costs). Since balance sheet inaccuracies tend to
err by understating inventory value (and hence carrying amounts), LIFO is more
harmonious with U.S. GAAP's principle of conservatism. On the other hand, the degree of
accuracy in the income statement depends on the entity continuing to maintain quantities of
inventory at least equal to the quantities reflected on the balance sheet. See generally
LAWRENCE A. CUNNINGHAM, INTRODUCTORY ACCOUNTING, FINANCE AND AUDITING

FOR LAWYERS 80-81 (4th ed. 2004).
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Concerning taxation, the Internal Revenue Code, as noted,
requires conformity between inventory accounting for financial and
tax reporting purposes. 86 Specifically, a company must use LIFO for
both or FIFO for both. The rationale is simple. In a period of rising
prices, FIFO results in reporting higher income compared to LIFO.
Thus, managers may prefer FIFO for financial accounting to show
investors higher income but prefer LIFO for tax accounting to pay
the government lower taxes.
The Internal Revenue Code's
conformity requirement reflects how U.S. culture generally considers
tax and financial accounting separate subjects with generally different
standards whereas in many countries the two subjects are
substantially co-extensive.
A broader point about the cultural contingency of giving greater
weight to the income statement or balance sheet is the question of
which emphasis is more susceptible to manipulation (sometimes
referred to as "tunneling" in the academic literature).-87 In countries
with dispersed equity ownership, such as the United States,
manipulating the income statement is better for controlling persons,
whose payoffs are a function of earnings per share.'88 In countries
with concentrated ownership, such as in Europe and Japan,
manipulating the balance sheet is better for controlling persons whose
payoffs come from allocating corporate assets to themselves rather
than serving as stewards for other claimants.
It is not obvious whether IFRS provisions are designed to
influence managerial propensity to manipulate the income statement
or the balance sheet. It is likewise uncertain whether accounting
standards could completely eliminate those propensities by proper
design. Still, the cultural differences that lead to these differential
incentives matter in assessing universal accounting standards, both in
production and application. Currently, it is more important for
investors in U.S. companies to constrain discretion over the income
statement and for investors in European companies to constrain
discretion over the balance sheet. But, if all use the same set of
standards, it may be impossible to make these distinctions. 89

186. See supra text accompanying note 127.
187. See John C. Coffee, Jr., A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and
Europe Differ, 21 OXFORD REV. ECON. POL'Y 198, 199 (2005); Simon Johnson et al.,
Tunneling, 90 AM. ECON. REV. (PAPERS & PROC.) 22 (2000).
188. See JOHN C. COFFEE, JR., GATEKEEPERS 81, 88-91 (2006).
189. On the other hand, a single set of global accounting standards may make the kinds
of tunneling activities in which managers or insiders are engaged more transparent. See
Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Unbundling and Measuring
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Time horizons, referring to the distinction between the long-term
and short-term, can be of great significance in conceiving appropriate
accounting standards.
Consider the case of Germany, which
expressly permits and may even require the recognition of revenue or
expense through hidden reserves across multiple time periods.190
Although relevant in some countries, these have little to do with
recognition concepts in U.S. or U.K. accounting, which reflect more
immediate time periods.
The use of hidden reserves, also followed in other European
countries, including Austria, Denmark, Finland, and Switzerland, and
to lesser degrees in Spain, would constitute earnings management in
the United States and United Kingdom and would be a violation of
both accounting standards and securities laws. 9 ' Even if these
principles were abandoned for enterprises using IFRS, traditional
knowledge and sensibilities associated with each tradition would
likely play a part in applications. The effect of this is that preparers in
different countries could, in good faith, apply identical standards in
different ways.
E.

The Market

The relative role of markets in corporate activity covered by
accounting reports can influence the character and sensibilities
related to the content and application of accounting standards. An
example appears in the fundamental accounting issue of measuring
assets. In general, there are two choices: measuring assets based on
observed transactions (known as historical cost accounting), and
measuring assets based on prevailing market conditions (known as
192
fair value accounting).
National accounting systems take differing stances on whether to
prefer historical cost or fair value accounting in general and in
specific circumstances. Many are dual-attribute models, in which
some items are measured using historical cost and others are
Tunneling 39 (University of Texas School of Law, Working Paper No. 117, 2007), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=1030529.
190. See ENNO W. ERCKLENTZ, JR., 2 MODERN GERMAN CORPORATION LAW 442-45

(1979).
191. See id.; DONALD E. KIESO ET AL., INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING 826 (10th ed.
2001).
192. For a useful practical summary and assessment of these approaches, see Stephen
J. Ryan, Fair Value Accounting: Understanding the Issues Raised by the Credit Crunch
(Council of Institutional Investors, White Paper, July 2008), available at
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/correspondence/2008/CII%20Fair%2
OValue%2OPaper%20(final)%20%20071108.pdf.
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measured using fair value. The choice is determined according to
trade-offs between accounting's goal of relevance and that of
reliability.
The appeal of historical cost accounting is that measurements
arise from observed transactions, such as the purchase price of an
asset, which leads to reliable figures. Judgments are required to
allocate that cost over the asset's life. As time passes, the historical
cost figure becomes less relevant in the context of prevailing
conditions.
The appeal of fair value accounting is that measurements are
based on prevailing conditions, such as market prices of an asset,
which leads to relevant figures. 93 But, cost allocations may require
adjustment; a limitation occurs when exact market prices are
inaccessible (either because the asset does not trade on a market, the
asset trades infrequently, or the asset has few substitutes), making it
less reliable than historical cost figures.
U.S. GAAP traditionally preferred historical cost accounting,
subject to a "lower of cost or market principle" that used market
values when these were lower. 9 4 A U.S. trend toward favoring fair
value accounting began in the latter twentieth century.'95 For its part,
IFRS favors fair value accounting, in part as a product of the projects

193. See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Finance Theory and Accounting Fraud: Fantastic
Futures Versus Conservative Histories,53 BUFF. L. REV. 789, 792-93 (2005).

194. Id.
195. See Stanley Siegel, The Coming Revolution in Accounting: The Emergence of Fair

Value as the FundamentalPrincipleof GAAP, 42 WAYNE L. REV. 1839, 1839 (1996). See
generally G. A. Swanson, Accountability and the Drift Towards 'Fair Value Measurement'
(SSRN, Working Paper No. 487043, 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=487043
(showing a growing trend toward fair value accounting); FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD.,
STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING CONCEPTS No. 7, USING CASH FLOW
INFORMATION AND PRESENT VALUE IN ACCOUNTING MEASUREMENTS (Feb. 2000),
availableat http://www.fasb.org/pdf/con7.pdf (revealing the late twentieth century move to

fair value accounting). Other prominent FASB standards reflecting this movement are
See FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF
FASB No. 133, 155, 157, and 159.
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 133, ACCOUNTING FOR DERIVATIVE
INSTRUMENTS AND HEDGING ACTIVITIES 20-27 (June 1998), available at
http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas133.pdf; FIN. ACCT. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL
ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 155, ACCOUNTING FOR CERTAIN HYBRID FINANCIAL
INSTRUMENTS 1 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fas155.pdf; FIN. ACCT.
STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 157, FAIR

VALUE MEASUREMENTS 1-2 (Sept. 2006), available at http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl57.pdf;
FIN. ACC. STNDS. BD., STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 155,
THE FAIR VALUE OPTION FOR FINANCIAL ASSETS AND FINANCIAL LIABILITIES 1-2

(Feb. 2007), availableat http://www.fasb.org/pdf/fasl59.pdf.
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designed to converge IFRS and U.S. GAAP.196 Other national
accounting systems vary in their relative preference for historical cost
and fair value accounting. Thus, any choice IFRS makes will entail
cultural adjustment in some countries.
Further, a putative advantage of fair value accounting is its use of
markets as a basis for asset measurement. This is an appealing notion
because IFRS are designed, in large part, to expand capitalism. Yet a
limitation arises if markets are imperfect or unavailable to measure
particular assets. When that occurs, preparers and auditors must
estimate fair value using judgments based on hypothetical valuation
modeling tools.
This activity raises a broad question of how much deference
these actors should receive when making such judgments compared
to how much power investors and other users of financial statements
should have to challenge those judgments. The national significance
of this question will vary according to local investor demographics,
including the mix of debt and equity in a capital structure and the
degree of ownership concentration or dispersion.
F.

The State

The role of the state varies across nations, even within capitalist
societies. In comparative terms, the social democrat traditions
prevalent in many continental European nations demand a state role
consciously committed to protecting its citizens, including in the
context of economic policy. This sensibility often also results in the
identification of some corporations as national champions and some
constituent groups, such as labor unions, as entitled to special status.
In contrast, U.S. sensibilities, certainly among conservatives and even
among many centrists and liberals, evince a more individualistic
proclivity that reduces the role of the state in economic life (and other
spheres). Thus, there are no or few national corporate champions in
the United States.
The consequence of these sensibilities is illustrated by differences
between traditional French accounting compared to U.S. (and U.K.)
accounting. French accounting is heavily linked to, and co-extensive

196. A prominent international accounting standard reflecting this appetite is IAS No.
39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. See generally IASC
FOUNDATION, IAS 39 FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS: RECOGNITION AND MEASUREMENT
(2005), available at http://www.iasb.org/NR/rdonlyres/D9CBD62-FOA8-4401-A90D483C63800CAA/0/IAS39.pdf (describing the steps by which IAS No. 39 affects the IFRS'
plan).
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with, state fiscal policies, 9 7 while in the United States, tax accounting
and financial accounting are distinct. Also, the U.S./U.K. income
statement is designed to present information in forms useful to
decision-making by equity owners, whereas traditional French income
statements were organized according to a statutory scheme that
reflected an orientation toward the French state.'98 Similarly,
U.S./U.K. balance sheets conceptualize assets in economic terms,
while traditional French accounting conceives of them in a
"patrimonial sense" of interests in tangible property. 99
The state's role also bears on relative accounting conservatism.
States may prefer a level of conservatism designed to generate
desired tax revenue from corporations subject to tax within their
jurisdiction. The exact appetite various states have for relative
accounting conservatism may depend on population demographics,
the manner of raising fiscal revenue, and the influence of economic
theories on national policy, such as views on what supply-side effects
have on production and total tax revenue. Whatever the appetite is,
it may differ from those of other constituents within a country and
differ from those prevalent in other countries.
A state's net appetite for relative accounting conservatism may
also be influenced by the demands of corporations and their
constituents domiciled within the country. In countries that tend to
identify national champions among their corporate elite, a national
solicitude toward their interests is likely to interact with fiscal policymaking. The net appetite also likely will be influenced by the
historical relationship between financial and tax accounting. In the
United States, because these accounting systems have been distinct,
financial accounting can generally be evaluated independently of
fiscal policy. For the several countries in which financial and tax
accounting are co-extensive, the state's interest will continue to
influence desired choices within financial accounting. 0
197. See Cunningham, supra note 154, at 919-22.
198. See Jacques

Richard,

France:

Group Accounts, in 2 TRANSNATIONAL

ACCOUNTING 1137 (Dieter Ordelheide & KPMG eds., 2d ed. 2001).
199. Id.
200. The emerging literature investigates the relationship between IFRS reporting and
traditional European tax accounting, finding substantial congruence between the two. See
generally Eva Eberhartinger & Margret Klostermann, What If IFRS Were a Tax Base?
New Empirical Evidence from an Austrian Perspective, (SSRN, Working Paper No.

1080512, 2008), available at www.ssrn.com/abstractid=1080512 (exploring the potential
tax effects on IFRS corporate taxation). It is likely that difference rather than similarity
would exist between U.S. tax reporting and IFRS by a wider margin than existing
differences between U.S. tax reporting and U.S. GAAP. If so, these comparatives suggest,
incrementally, that IFRS is better tailored to European contexts than to U.S. contexts. If
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The foregoing substantive challenges suggest that achieving
comparability may be unlikely.2 1 Particular national, cultural, and
legal features shape the development of accounting standards, and
those features are unlikely to cease exerting pressure even if all
nations nominally recognize IFRS. The likely result would be
enduring differences and impaired comparability. If so, this may
justify foregoing the quest for comparability in favor of obtaining the
offsetting advantages of competition. This would support the SEC's
proposal to allow companies to choose which reporting system to use.
But, as discussed next, other apparatuses the SEC is discussing and is
creating or coordinating to meet structural challenges are expressly
designed to increase comparability.2 2 Returns on that investment in
comparability are likely to be greater without competition, because
the necessary institutions and coordination devices are worth less if
competing standards vie for recognition in the marketplace. This
tension further reflects limitations on the SEC's global accounting
vision.
III. STRUCTURAL CHALLENGES

Convergence processes and demand for universal accounting can
Yet structural
help meet many of the substantive challenges.
challenges will also face any international accounting standard setter
and its supporting regime. In contrast to under-appreciation of
substantive challenges, the SEC has discussed structural challenges
extensively. But, even this attention is modest when compared to the
actual stakes. Structural challenges raise a host of issues concerned
with contemporary global governance.20° For example, a general
challenge lies in adapting to the international governance level
this hypothesis is incorrect, and IFRS-U.S. tax reporting is less divergent than U.S. GAAP
and U.S. tax reporting, this could support wider adoption of IFRS in the United States.
(and even justify and enable the process of converging accounting and tax reporting in the
United States). See generally Wolfgang Schon, The Odd Couple: A Common Future for
Financialand Tax Accounting?, 58 TAX L. REV. 111 (2005) (discussing the potential for
wider adoption of IFRS in the United States).
201. The SEC expressly acknowledges this likelihood. See SEC Concept Release on
Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,608 ("It is likely that not everyone will apply
accounting standards consistently or appropriately.").
202. Id. (stating that due to the likelihood of variation in application, SEC must
coordinate with other national regulators to promote comparable applications).
203. See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Nico Krisch & Richard B. Stewart, The
Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 15 (2005)
(detailing the rise of global administrative law and the issues associated with it).
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domestic organizations that are embedded in a local system of
administrative law.' 4 For accounting, this requires attention to
matters of production, enforcement, and compliance, all of which this
Part analyzes in turn.
A.

ProductionModels

The SEC has spoken firmly concerning recommended
institutional attributes and governance design for IASB. In fact, the
SEC's current vision is a direct product of previous SEC views,
especially those that led IASB to reform itself in 2000.05 Its effort to
encourage IASC to reorganize itself into the IASB using FASB's
model may have been good advice. Yet numerous differences exist
between producing national standards and producing international
standards, many of which the SEC overlooks or scantly analyzes, at
least publicly.2 6
1. Delegation
U.S. securities laws vest the SEC with authority to define
GAAP. °7 The SEC traditionally discharges this responsibility by
delegation. Pursuant to this authority, in 1973, the SEC formally
recognized FASB pronouncements as authoritative. 28 This ordained
a delegation model that raised agency-principal issues. Over the
sometimes volatile history of FASB's life, these issues have required
adjustments in governance design and care in stating rationales.
The SEC delegated to FASB for several reasons. The general
reasons, applicable to many agency delegations, include efficiency
from specialization, deflection of blame for failure, and conservation
of its resources. Other reasons are more specific to accounting and
focus on the fact that standards are complex, technical, and fastchanging. In such settings, it is likely that comparatively fewer
government employees have required knowledge and training.
Further, retaining employees with specialized knowledge can
204. See Walter Mattli & Tim Buthe, Global Private Governance: Lessons from a
National Model of Setting Standards in Accounting, 68 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 225,
225-26 (2005).

205. The SEC's earlier influence posed some of the difficulties associated with the
SEC's power to recognize IASB. See supra text accompanying notes 6-45.
206. See generally David Zaring, International Law by Other Means: The Twilight
Existence of International Financial Regulatory Organizations, 33 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281

(1998) (containing extensive analysis of numerous bodies, including IOSCO).
207. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77g, 77s(a), 77aa(25), 77aa(26), 78c(b), 781(b), 78m(b), 80a-8, 80a-

29(e), 80a-30, and 80a-37(a) (2006).
208. SEC, Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973).
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obviously be costly to an agency. Assigning responsibility to a private
agent as an alternative can be a more efficient means of establishing
GAAP. °9
Many of the same grounds for the SEC to delegate to FASB are
But
applicable to reasons for delegating authority to IASB.
additional factors come into play. Ultimately, the motivation is to
create global standards that promote international comparability and
facilitate the continued spread of global capitalism. This situation
presents vastly different stakes than the SEC's delegation to FASB,
including sacrifices in national sovereignty.
2. Agency
In any delegation, a principal vests discretion in the agent. The
extent of discretion may be narrow or broad, according to the relative
strength of the relationship. In traditional U.S. administrative law
practice, the relation between such principals and agents is complex
A series of principal-agent relationships exists
but familiar.
(beginning with citizens functionally delegating to legislators),
ultimately vesting FASB with agency powers exercised on behalf of
the SEC as its principal.
The agency issue for U.S. administration is whether the delegate
is serving the public interest as a neutral, independent expert, or
whether he is captured by special interests and does not represent the
public interest. FASB faces pressures from managers and investors
and many other constituencies, including auditors and business
enterprises.21 ° All can wield influence directly through lobbying
campaigns and comment letters on proposed standards and

209. The accounting context also amplifies the general blame-deflection rationale of
delegation in two ways. First, financial accounting scandals are inevitable, so the value of
delegation to avoid blame increases. Second, standard-setting rarely pleases many
constituents and often displeases them intensely.
210. The Business Roundtable, a trade organization composed of chief executives of
the largest U.S. companies, is an active participant. Substantive examples include the
standard on foreign currency translation, first proposed in 1976 and finally revised under
heavy criticism in 1979. Governance examples include getting FASB to create an
Emerging Issues Task Force to respond to developments promptly. Process examples
include getting representation on the Financial Accounting Foundation, the trustees who
oversee FASB. A mixed example concerned stock option accounting, which the
Roundtable helped block for more than a decade by gaining by-law changes relating to
setting FASB's technical agenda. For a review of such instances, see Mattli & Buthe,
supra note 204, at 243-44. See generally William W. Bratton, Private Standards, Public
Governance: A New Look at the FinancialAccounting StandardsBoard, 48 B.C. L. REV. 5

(2007) (discussing the FASB's system of governance and the challenges that it presents).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

meetings.2 1 The stakes are high: FASB standards affect many
interests, sometimes pitting against each other the interests of
preparers (managers) and users (investors and others), and often
presenting serious implications for capital allocation, stock prices,
investment selection, and executive compensation.
The consensus view is generally that FASB has managed to
preserve its independence, and the main theory behind this view is
that the SEC-FASB agency relationship is strong.212 The relationship
is strong because their missions are aligned in the name of protecting
investors, and the bond is reinforced by shared accounting expertise
and a cooperative approach to policy formulation and standard
setting. Importantly, the SEC also carries a big stick: it can overrule
FASB and has the power to revoke its authority. 213 Indeed, the SEC
has plenary power over establishing accounting standards in the
United States. Thus, its delegation to FASB, or to any other body, is
revocable at will.
At the global level, delegation is more complex. As an initial
matter, the SEC and its regulatory counterparts in other countries
each delegate to the 100-plus member IOSCO (and each of them, in
turn, exercises authority delegated to it by its respective national
legislature or equivalent). 2 4' Each regulator as well as IOSCO then
delegates power to IASB (or, more precisely, to a Foundation that in
turn oversees IASB). On the surface, this model can be imagined as
no more complex than the SEC-FASB model-it simply substitutes
an IOSCO-IASB relationship for the SEC-FASB one.
Yet, greater complexities bubble beneath the surface. IOSCO is
unlikely to be a unified principal to IASB in the way that the SEC is
to FASB. After all, it consists of as many "principals" as there are
members, which amounts to well over 100. Additionally, members
211. FASB's formal structure includes the Financial Accounting Foundation, which is

responsible for governance operations of the board. See Financial Accounting Foundation
Homepage, FAF Financial Accounting Foundation, http://www.fasb.org/faf/index2.shtml

(last visited Nov. 21, 2008). Constituents also exert influence in setting standards by
lobbying activities directed to that Foundation. It is possible to conceive of FAF as adding
an additional principal to the model. See generally Mattli & Buthe, supra note 204

(discussing the agency issues involved in private regulatory bodies). But FAF is a mere
agent too, whose fortunes are tied directly to FASB's. Both serve together at the pleasure
of the SEC. True, FAF has different members and a different mission than FASB, but it is
directly linked to FASB's mission.
212. See Bratton, supra note 210, at 7-8, 35-36.

213. See supra text accompanying notes 96-120 (discussing SEC's authority under the
securities laws, including limitations on that authority established by the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002).
214. See Zaring, supra note 206, at 292-97.
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can be expected to exhibit different views of what constitutes suitable
accounting standards.
While the goal of promoting global
comparability in financial reporting or facilitating cross-border capital
flows may provide a basis for consensus, this may be constrained by
national variations in securities regulation, corporate governance,
corporate finance, and other contexts discussed earlier.
When IASB adopts a standard, it affects many more interests
than when FASB does the same. Preparers and users in a global
context are vastly more heterogeneous than they are within one
country. At the global level, each of these groups also has a cultural,
and perhaps even geographic, home. Different demands can be
expected from U.K. compared to French companies and from
Russian compared to American investors. The agency issue may
remain regardless of whether the private body is serving the public
interest, but it is vexing to evaluate the public interest in a global
context. IASB can expect to face pressures from constituencies just
as FASB does. But given scale and diversity, it may be infeasible to
consider and evaluate overtures from all or many constituents, or
respond to or resist them. 15
Potentially missing from this arrangement is the capacity of the
principal to overrule the agent or revoke its power. In theory, it
should be possible for IOSCO to exercise principal-like authority
over IASB. But that likewise depends on conceiving of IOSCO as a
unitary agent on behalf of each member, which seems unlikely. This
problem has generated considerable debate concerning the process by
which IASB standards should be recognized within each country.
One alternative is the deference approach. Because national
interests are addressed solely at the governance level, IOSCO
members have direct input into the structure and leadership of IASB
and its Foundation. Beyond that, power ceases. When IASB adopts
a standard, it becomes binding in member states without additional
national action. Further, national sovereignty to override an IASB

215. See Stephen A. Zeff, "Political"Lobbying of ProposedStandards: A Challenge to
the IASB, 16 ACCT. HORIZONS 43-54 (March 2002). Potentially adding complexity is the
support for IASB from numerous other global bodies, including the World Trade
Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervision, the European Union, and the G7 Finance Ministers and their
Central

Bank

Governors.

See NICOLAS VERSON, THE GLOBAL ACCOUNTING

EXPERIMENT 11, 14 (2006), available at http://www.bruegel.org/Files/media/PDF/
Publications/Blueprint/BP2_accounting.pdf. These variegated bodies no doubt will have
interests and preferences that differ from those of securities regulators-and possibly from
investors, businesses, and auditors, as well as from each other.
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standard or interpretation is exercised only in extreme cases.216 The
goal and effect of the deference approach is to maximize global
consistency and comparability, whereas the price is a sacrifice in
national sovereignty.
Another alternative is the endorsement approach. National
interests are protected at the adoption stage; thus, IASB
pronouncements are not binding until a sovereign authority formally
enacts them, either through official action of the national securities
regulator or by legislation. To date, most sovereigns have followed
this practice, including the European Union,217 Hong Kong,
Singapore, and others. Thus, the sovereign retains maximum national
discretion and preserves national sovereignty. But, this approach
threatens the quest for consistency and comparability worldwide by
consciously injecting local politics into putatively international
standards.

The European Union follows the endorsement approach. 18 The
E.U. must specifically acknowledge particular standards and translate
them into numerous languages before they become law. This process

invites political input through a series of consultations with four
discrete bodies.2 19 E.U. law states conditions that standards must

meet:

consistency with the true and fair view requirement,

conduciveness to the "European public good," and meeting the

"criteria of understandability, relevance, reliability and comparability
required of the financial information needed for making economic
decisions and assessing the stewardship of management.""22 E.U. law
216. Besides this situation, IOSCO and IASB are private, non-governmental
organizations. So neither Congress nor any other legislative authority enjoys oversight. In
contrast, Congress wields direct authority over the SEC and indirect authority, through it,
over FASB. See generally Hunt, supra note 44 (discussing the distinctions among, and the
interactions between, the various players in global securities regulation).
217. Endorsement is not required by individual member countries within the European
Union, which have ceded accounting standard-setting authority to it. Commission
Proposal for a European Parliament and Council Regulation on the Application of
International Accounting Standards, COM (2001) 80 (Feb. 28, 2002), available at
http://www.iasplus.com/europe/0202iasreport.pdf.
218. Id.
219. These bodies are: the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group, which
provides private input into the process from business groups; the Accounting Regulatory
Committee, a political body representing each member state; the Economic and Monetary
Affairs Committee of the European Parliament; and a Standards Advice Review Group,
which provides input from accounting experts. See VERSON, supra note 215, at 17.
220. The latter criteria are contained in IASB's own framework so they should rarely
be a formidable problem. See Memorandum from the European Financial Reporting
Advisory Group to Dr. Alexander Schaub 2 (Mar. 3, 2004), available at http://
ec.europa.eu./internal-market/accounting/docs/ias/efrag/efrag-2004-03-endorsement-
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requires taking account of competitive effects of accounting standards
on E.U. companies, including precluding IFRS that would lower
reported income compared to U.S. GAAP 2 1
From a national perspective, setting aside political dimensions of
E.U. accounting law,222 preferences for the deference or endorsement
approach may depend on whether IOSCO can design governance
features to assure that standards are likely to be acceptable to each
country. 223 That would mean that national overrides (withdrawals of
endorsement) are only exercised in rare circumstances.
Thus,
achieving necessary comfort would require confidence in members'
ability to coordinate and achieve consensus. There must be enough
coordination to assure that, as a principal, IOSCO can assert
authority over IASB to provide credible, but not excessive, threats to
overrule it or revoke its power.
Assessing the probability of optimal coordination and results
depends on considering the potential problems IOSCO will face from
collective action, free riding, and divergent interests. Predictably,
IOSCO member incentives will be proportional to the scope of
activities under their respective jurisdictions affected by IASB. In the
initial term, the most interested members will be the SEC and CESR,
followed closely by national securities regulators in Brazil, Hong
Kong, and Japan, and perhaps in China and Russia.
Members with smaller stakes may have fewer incentives to
monitor. Therefore, they can free ride but will find it harder to form
letter-en.pdf. However, the concepts are sufficiently vague for this to potentially occur.
See id.
221. See HERWITZ & BARRETT, supra note 10, at 177 (quoting the E.U. directive).
222. By 2007, the European Union had exercised this acknowledgement on numerous
separate occasions, with the result that substantially all IFRS had been adopted. But this

is not inevitable, and not all IASB standards may make their way into E.U. Law, at least
not without modification or delay, as has occurred on several occasions. See supra text

accompanying notes 31-34. For an updated status report prepared by European Financial
Reporting Advisory Group, see EUROPEAN FINANCIAL REPORTING ADVISORY GROUP
("EFRAG") THE EU ENDORSEMENT STATUS REPORT, http://www.efrag.org/content/

default.asp?id=4090 (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).

223. Despite differences, the deference and endorsement models may yield similar
results. The issue is the default rule. The deference model makes IASB standards binding
absent contrary action; the endorsement model makes them binding with supporting

action. The extent of resulting similarity depends on how norms develop and how fast
official regulatory or legislative actions are taken. Under the deference model, standards
assume effectiveness promptly and remain in effect unless coordinated local political
action can be mounted to reverse them. More standards are likely to be in effect. Under
the endorsement model, standards are not effective until that political process has been
completed. It is possible that just as many standards would become effective and that the
process would simply be protracted. More likely, fewer standards would actually be in

effect in all parts of the word.
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blocs to protect their interests when those are opposed to interests of
larger stakeholders. Solving this problem tends to support the
desirability of the deference approach, which requires each member
to commit to a pact of non-interference with IASB. To avoid
allowing this to reduce joint power of revocation or censure, it is
necessary to obtain consensus on the circumstances when that may be
justified.
To date, the SEC has not taken a public position on which
model, the deference or the endorsement model, it would prefer or
recommend for the United States. But, certain clues suggest a
willingness to take the deference approach.
First, the SEC
emphasizes recognizing IFRS only as issued by IASB.2 24 This
implicitly rejects the endorsement model, if used by other countries,
unless the endorsement contains no modifications. Second, the SEC
appreciates how different its relationship is with IASB compared to
its relationship with FASB, and it has long sought to influence IASB
to establish an institutional basis to justify a deference approach.22
Beyond these clues, however, the SEC offers no public analysis of
these matters.
3. Design
Formal governance design is important to FASB's operations
and effectiveness. Since its founding, FASB gradually adopted design
features that resemble those that characterize U.S. federal
administrative agencies.226 FASB refers to these as "due process"
attributes,227 many copied from the Administrative Procedure Act.228
These include using procedures governing the development and
public review of standards, holding open meetings, and maintaining
229
other features associated with transparency.
Governance design issues include the qualifications and selection
process for board members, rules governing the approval of new
standards, and the use of formal advisory bodies to represent interests
of various groups, especially investors. Unfortunately, maintaining
the model's efficacy has never been easy, and periodic redesign of
224. See SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 987-93.
225. Evidence of continuing efforts to project U.S. influence into the IASB emerged
amid rumors that circulated in late 2007 concerning the possibility of a merger of FASB
and IASB and reshuffling of FASB's governance structure. See Floyd Norris, Overhaul
Proposedin Accounting StandardsBoard, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 2007, at C3.
226. See Bratton, supranote 210, at 11-26.
227. Id. at 14.
228. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552-53 (2006).
229. See Bratton, supra note 210, at 22-24.
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these devices has been an important factor in FASB's survival and
effectiveness. The endless revision is a product of prevailing and
changing sensibilities concerning the private-public balance prevalent
within the U.S. administrative state.
On the global scale, each country must take responsibility for
enabling its representation through a national securities regulator or
similar body.
Most operate through IOSCO (though nothing
prevents the non-member countries from seeking separate audience).
Thus, IOSCO's internal procedures must enable it to determine how
its members will be represented in IASB leadership and governance,
and the powers must include final approval over trustee and board
member selection, review of standard-setting procedures, and the
assurance of proper funding.2 30
The SEC's Chairman has discussed these matters with
counterparts from the European Union and Japan, but the SEC
provides no public analysis."' The joint group only issued one vague
press release about future collaborative steps,232 which instantly
attracted considerable criticism.2 33
For example, a particularly
troublesome oversight is that the SEC acknowledges the limited
investor voice within the IASB without expressing any proposals or
plans to correct it.234 Additionally, the SEC expressly recognizes the

230. In choosing trustees and board members, issues include national and regional
representation
plus constituent
representation,
including investor/user
and
preparer/auditor groups. IOSCO is responsible for forming IASB and determining its
membership and setting governance rules concerning such matters as what committees to
create and what authority they should have, as well as voting rules to pass standards and
other policy matters including agenda review and timing of production (including setting
any moratoria). Funding must be based on contributions from IOSCO or member
countries. See supra text accompanying notes 214-29.
231. See Cox, SEC Roundtable, supra note 56.
232. This appears to be the idea under discussion among national securities regulators.
Press Release, SEC, Authorities Responsible for Capital Market Regulation Work to
Enhance the Governance of the IASC Foundation (Nov. 7, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2007/2007-226.htm (joint press release of various securities
regulators discussing adding a "new monitoring body" to the IASB governance structure
as "a means of accountability to ... governmental authorities charged with protecting
investors [through] formal ties between important securities regulatory stakeholders and
the IASC Foundation"). The press release was issued jointly by SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox, European Internal Market and Services Commissioner Charlie
McCreevy, Financial Services Agency of Japan Commissioner Takafumi Sato, and IOSCO
Executive Committee Chairperson Jane Diplock. Id.
233. See Floyd Norris, Bye Bye Independence, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 6, 2007, available at
http://norris.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/11/06/bye-bye-independence/.
234. See SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75, at 988 (noting
comment letters on proposed rule critical of IASB's structure, including enhancing
geographic diversity of board and closer alignment with investor interests).
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problem of multiple principals but indicates an essential capitulation
to this circumstance.235 Thus, it seeks to maintain, but probably not
expand, its current role in IASB.236

4. Rationale
Within these design sensibilities and agency relationships,
FASB's founders made vital substantive decisions concerning the
rationale by which it would operate. In governance design and in
implementing the SEC-FASB principal-agency relationship, FASB
avowed adherence to a model of public responsiveness embedded in
traditional models of U.S. administrative agencies.237 This required
embracing the stance that FASB would be independent. At the same
time, it also positioned itself squarely on the side of investors (and
other external users of financial statements) rather than on the side of
businesses and auditors. It did this by announcing, in its initial
conceptual framework,
an overarching rationale in accounting called
2' 38
"decision usefulness."
Decision usefulness refers to the practice of assuring that
accounting information puts first the interests of external users of
financial information for making choices, especially investment
choices, for investors. Internal or managerial needs are subordinated.
The primacy of decision usefulness responds to the costs, recognized
by information economics, of information asymmetries between
managers and investors. 239 This desideratum of decision usefulness
helped earn FASB legitimacy among investors while using a rationale
to which managers could not reasonably object. After all, accounting
information is necessary to enable managerial decision-making too,
especially for internal resource allocations and enterprise
stewardship. But FASB's embrace of decision usefulness is only a
gesture toward managerial needs while making investors and markets
the primary constituents.24 °
235. See id. at 1007 ("We recognize that our relationship with the IASB is less direct
than our relationship with the FASB and that there are more and varied constituents of
the IASB than of the FASB. The result may be that our view will be one of many views
that the IASB receives from around the world and considers when developing future
standards.").
236. See id. at 988.
237. See Bratton, supra note 210, at 5.
238. Id.
239. See supra notes 183-84 and accompanying text.
240. Additional principles in FASB's conceptual framework reinforce this orientation,
especially the ideas of consistency and comparability, which also constrain managerial
discretion.
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The concept of decision usefulness could work, and be
acceptable, given U.S. culture. Once information is seen as a public
good, the need to generate it to reduce information asymmetries
appears. That is important to promote deep, active, liquid, and
efficient stock markets. It also is important in corporate culture, like
in the United States, characterized by the separation of investor
ownership from managerial control. All these defenses of the
decision usefulness goal, central to FASB's success, are distinctively
U.S. ideas and resonate strongly there.
Thus, IASB must make the same kinds of vital substantive
decisions as FASB made concerning the rationale for its standards.
But this too is more complex at IASB than at FASB. IASB appears
to embrace the decision usefulness rationale and acknowledges
investor primacy. However, both signals are fuzzy. First, the notion
of decision usefulness may not have the same meaning within a global
environment. Additionally, this notion is unlikely to perform the
same political or legitimacy functions among investors that it supplied
for FASB in the political environment of the United States in the
1970s.
Second, references to investor interests in IASB policy
statements equivocate. Numerous IASB documents repeatedly refer
to a mission of protecting the "public interest" but rarely refer to
protecting investors, whether they be international or U.S.
investors. 4 1 Instead, investors are mentioned in lists of constituents
that include "employees, lenders, suppliers and other trade creditors,
'
customers, governments and their agencies and the public."242
Such
statements often are followed by qualifying assertions that name
investors as a top priority, noting that, if financial statements are
useful to investors, they will also be useful to other constituencies.243
This heterodoxy is oddly congruent with the SEC's token recognition
of investor interests within its current global accounting vision.2"
5. History
On balance, FASB has succeeded based on its delegated agency
model, its suitable governance design, and a defensible substantive
241. See,
e.g.,
INTERNATIONAL
ACCOUNTING
STANDARDS
FOUNDATION, DUE PROCESS HANDBOOK FOR THE IASB
4

COMMITtEE

2006),
http://www.iasplus.com/resource/0604dueprocess.pdf (showing IASB's stated policy of
protecting the public interest).
242. Id. T 19.
243. Id. 20.
244. See supra text accompanying notes 1-8.
(Mar.
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rationale for its standards. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that
this success was easy or inevitable. On the contrary, FASB has faced
regular threats to its survival since its creation in 1973. Moreover,
FASB did not emerge from whole cloth-it was created by drawing
on the lessons of its two predecessors, both of which dissolved due to
failure in struggles for legitimacy.245
FASB's standards frequently provoke political controversy, often
by corporate managers campaigning against them. Further back, in
the 1990s, the toughest fight involved accounting for stock options, a
fight which led Congress to threaten to close FASB down if it
adopted such standards.246 In the 1980s, FASB managed to produce
new accounting standards for employee pensions and retirement
benefits despite managerial resistance and preference to retain the
more flexible, but opaque, standards then in effect.247
Lifethreatening debates from the 1970s included FASB's standards on
loss contingencies, loan losses, and accounting for exploration costs
and reserves in the oil and gas industry.248 Showing its resiliency,
FASB managed to survive despite these battles.
Just as FASB did not grow from whole cloth but from fits and
starts and the elimination of predecessors, IASB faces similar
struggles. Instructively, a similar fate befell IASB's predecessor, the
IASC. The IASC struggled through the 1980s and 1990s and
ultimately terminated and reconstituted itself as IASB in 2000.249
Despite the fate of the IASC, it is possible for IASB to survive. But
survival on the world stage will be thornier for IASB than survival in
the United States has been for FASB. Participants should be
prepared for failure and the endless need to revise the system and all
its components.
Of note, it is not evident from official SEC
245. FASB's predecessors were Committee on Accounting Procedures (CAP) (19381953) and Accounting Principles Board (APB) (1962-1973). See generally PREVITS &
MERINO, supra note 6 (providing background on the history of the FASB).
246. In the case of stock option accounting, Enron and contemporaneous scandals led
to passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and political winds favorable to FASB that
enabled it to adopt the standard. See LEVITT, supra note 30, at 109-13.
247. See, e.g., Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for
Corporate America, 19 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 196-98 (1997) (compiling, arranging, and
introducing essays by Warren E. Buffett).
248. In the case of oil and gas, companies had been capitalizing drilling costs when
FASB said it wanted them expensed. Amid the 1970s energy crisis, Congress wrested
control of the situation and directed the SEC to write the standards. See Accounting for
Oil and Gas Producing Activities, SEC Release No. 5966, Exchange Act Release No.
15108, Holding Company Act Release No. 20688, Investment Company Act Release No.
10384, Accounting Series Release No. 253, 43 Fed. Reg. 40,688 passim (proposed Aug. 31,
1978).
249. See supranotes 6-29 and accompanying text.
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fully

Enforcement Strategies

Just as production and interpretation functions must be lodged in
a single entity to achieve the quest for global comparability,
enforcement must likewise be centralized or coordinated to the same
end. Additional challenges arise for enforcement strategy given
absence of a single global enforcer, along with wide global variation
in enforcement intensity.2 50 Rather, enforcement powers operate at
national levels.
Three solutions to this challenge appear. First, the most obvious
solution is for the various national regulators to coordinate efforts.
The SEC pins its hopes on this solution. Second, in the longer run, it
may be possible to imagine some form of global enforcement
authority, perhaps lodged within an arm of IASB and consisting of
formal involvement of pre-existing authorities. The SEC does not
discuss this. Third, a functional source of enforcement occurs within
the large multi-national auditing firms. The SEC asked for public
comment on this strategy. Each solution is considered in turn below.
1. International Coordination
Currently, national securities laws and related accounting
standards are enforced at national levels. Within the United States,
companies that violate accounting standards are subject to an
elaborate enforcement apparatus administered by the SEC and
private parties.2 51 In the United Kingdom, the Financial Services
25 2
Authority plays a role functionally equivalent to that of the SEC.
Within each European state, and most other countries, one or more
local securities regulators perform enforcement functions. 253 For the
European Union as a whole, the Committee of European Securities

250. See Coffee, supra note 162, at 244.
251. See SEC, The Investor's Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains
Market Integrity, and Facilitates Capital Formation, http://sec.gov/aboutlwhatwedo.shtml
(last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
252. See Financial Services Authority, What We Do, http://www.fsa.gov.uk/Pages/
About/What/index.shtml (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
253. See generally Thomas M.J. Mollers, The Progress of German Information
Disclosure Requirements:
A Comparative Law Perspective in Light of Recent
Developments in European Capital Markets Law, 30 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 279

(2004) (discussing regulations and enforcement requirements set forth in the Market
Abuse Directive across many European countries).
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Regulators (CESR) is the coordinator.25 4 The possibility of private
enforcement varies across countries.255
The SEC acknowledges that national securities regulators have
national, not global, mandates.25 6 It states: "Because it is likely that
not everyone will apply accounting standards consistently or
appropriately, securities regulators are developing infrastructure to
identify and address the application of IFRS globally. '257 The SEC is
confident in its partnerships and information sharing arrangements
2 56 The
with CESR and ISOCO.
SEC's sole stated grounds for this
confidence are: (1) in 2007, IOSCO started a "database for
cataloguing and sharing securities regulators' experience on IFRS
application around the world"; and (2) the SEC agreed with CESR
"that regulators should endeavor to avoid conflicting conclusions
''259
regarding the application and enforcement of IFRS.
The SEC believes that these arrangements are sufficient to meet
the challenge, but it espouses this belief without offering analysis to
support its confidence.26 ° Several conditions, none of which the SEC
mentions, would have to be met for the local securities regulatory
apparatus to succeed. First, all securities regulators in the world
would have to agree on what each IFRS provision means. This is
possible, though neither inevitable nor likely. More likely, the
principles-oriented character of many of the standards may impede
uniform enforcement across countries.
Second, regulators would have to insist that each standard be
applied in accordance with that shared understanding by all
enterprises subject to their respective jurisdictions. As above, this is
also possible, but not likely. All important accounting decisions
require judgments, and people making those judgments, including
preparers and regulators, do so in local, not global, environments.
Thus, judgments likely will differ across countries to reflect local
political, economic, and cultural realities, including those noted
earlier arising from legal origins or manifesting in varying contexts of
254. See The Committee of European Securities Regulators, CESR in Short,
http://www.cesr-eu.org/index.php?page=cesrinshort&mac=O&id (last visited Nov. 21,
2008).
255. See Coffee, supra note 162, at 266-67.
256. SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,608.
257. Id.
258. See, e.g., SEC Proposed Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 12, at 37,969
(discussing database shared with IOSCO members that became operational in January
2007 and an SEC-CESR information-sharing work plan agreed to in August 2006).
259. SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,608.
260. See SEC Proposed Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 12, at 37,967-68.
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securities regulation, corporate governance, corporate finance, and
the roles of markets and states.261
Third, governments in each jurisdiction would have to support
these efforts. This issue of sovereignty, considered earlier in the
context of production and interpretation, may pose more
If
considerable challenges in the context of enforcement.
governments are reluctant to cede sovereignty in the production and
interpretation of standards, preferring the endorsement to the
deference approach, they may be even less likely to cede such powers
Too many variables are potentially
in terms of enforcement.
implicated in enforcement decisions to cede such power ex-ante.
Further, the production, interpretation, and enforcement aspects
of accounting are interrelated. A country can cede power ex-ante
over all three, using the deference approach in production and
interpretation, and tying one's hands ahead of time to an IOSCOTo preserve some measure of
ordained enforcement policy.
sovereignty, one may adopt a deference approach in production and
interpretation while at the same time reserving plenary power over
enforcement. Or, a country could reserve power over production by
adhering to the endorsement approach and agree ex-ante to follow a
standardized enforcement policy. Ultimately, whatever countries or
national securities regulators may agree to, there always will be
grounds later to violate the agreement by citing national sovereignty.
A pessimistic and optimistic case may be made for evaluating the
SEC's confidence in its partnerships to achieve enforcement
coordination and promote comparability. For the pessimistic case,
consider that the European Union has told members to use IFRS.
Are companies in those countries doing so uniformly? The evidence
summarized in Part I of this Article provides grounds for
skepticism.26 2 Some members are notorious for ignoring E.U.
directives, especially the Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Luxembourg,
and Portugal.263 Many members, including such diverse countries as
Cyprus, Germany, Hungary, and Spain, have altered IFRS to reflect
local needs. 26 Beyond the European Union, IFRS endorsers include

261. See supra text accompanying notes 149-202.
262. See supra text accompanying notes 6-148.
263. See Tobias Buck, Italy Under Fire for Worst Record on EU Market Laws, FIN.
TIMES, July 19,2005, at 9.
264. See David Henry, A Better Way to Keep the Books?, BUS. WK., Sept. 15, 2008, at

35.
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such assorted countries as Armenia, Iraq, and Kuwait.265 Considering
this diversity, it may be naive to believe that accounting standards will
be enforced uniformly in all these places.
For the optimistic case, it may be possible for governments to
value the virtues of capitalistic convergence sufficiently highly as to
reduce the frequency or occasions that will prompt intervention. But,
these may be limited to extraordinary circumstances of national
urgency. An example is the experience of Japan in the late 1990s.
When accounting rules required Japanese banks to record big losses
on large loans in the 1990s, Japan's government intervened against
doing so to avert a national financial crisis.266 On the other hand,
interventions may recur with surprising frequency. Consider how,
after IASB adopted rules for financial instruments, the French
government lobbied the European Union to obtain an exception to
reduce volatility in reports of French banks.267 Steps like these will
continue and, depending on frequency, could stealthily destroy global
uniformity.
2. Global Authority
The foregoing points suggest that it may be necessary to consider
creating and anointing a global enforcer, but equally suggest that the
prospects of doing so are dim. It is not impossible to imagine and
devise a more centralized global enforcement body that achieves
legitimacy, recognition, and support. However, the near term
likelihood of this possibility seems low. In the long term, the
struggles of the coordination effort that are likely necessary may
forge pathways toward a more centralized global enforcement
authority. The process of coordination may lead gradually to the de
facto emergence of a global enforcer.
It probably is a mistake to believe that the SEC would emerge as
the global compliance enforcer. The SEC lacks jurisdiction over most
companies in the world, and it seems doubtful that many countries
would cede national enforcement policy to a foreign government.
Moreover, the SEC is far better equipped to take enforcement
actions against U.S. companies compared to foreign private issuers.
265. For a detailed list of countries requiring or permitting IFRS, see IAS Plus, Use of
IFRS by Jurisdiction, http:l/www.iasplus.comlcountry/useias.htm (last visited Nov. 21,
2008).
266. Charles K. Whitehead, What's Your Sign?-lnternational Norms, Signals, and
Compliance,27 MICH. J. INT'L L. 695, 728 (2006).
267. See Floyd Norris, Europe Closer to Accepting Uniform Accounting Rules, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 22,2004, at C3.
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It is possible that its historical practice will change following
recognition of IFRS. However, even if it did, comparability may
increase among U.S.-listed companies and remain divergent
throughout the rest of the world.
3. Auditing Firms
Because of the questionable utility of the foregoing enforcement
options, large auditing firms worldwide can be seen as a source of
functional enforcement that can contribute to promoting global
uniformity. The SEC acknowledges uncertainty about the capacity of
firms to develop requisite skills, and it notes reason to question
whether firms will maintain quality controls across global networks to
promote consistent application. 268 Notwithstanding those concerns,
the SEC asked for comment on how firms may promote
comparability. 69 Several conditions would have to be met for
auditing firms to succeed in promoting uniform application.
Unfortunately, the SEC does not discuss any of them.
First, each firm must be sufficiently integrated so that its firmwide policies facilitate intra-firm coordination, and the firms as a
group must sufficiently coordinate to prevent excessive inter-firm
variation. Both requirements are more readily achievable now than
before. Each firm is a global network of members that are integrated
and share information on a global scale. There are currently far
fewer large firms than historically (four that are pan-global and a
The firms once
handful with global potential or aspirations).
competed on the basis of quality reporting that led to identifiable
variation in firm policy, but those days are gone. Thus, uniformity
should be more easily achieved. Still, many national and local
affiliates of the large firms enjoy considerable autonomy so that issues
of competence, conflicts of interest, and susceptibility to local
pressures endure.
Second, the firms would need incentives to induce client
compliance. Incentives can arise from economic payoffs, reputational
stakes, and legal liability risks. It is uncertain whether firms currently
have requisite incentives concerning U.S. GAAP-the incentives are
likely to fall in a global IFRS reporting environment. Indeed, the
largest firms all support moving the world, including all U.S. issuers,
to IFRS. But their support is made expressly conditional on changes
to law and business to increase their and their client's rights to
268. SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,601.
269. Id. at 45,608.
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exercise judgment when applying the principles in IFRS. This stance
includes calls to reduce auditor liability risk, which is an important
stimulus for inducing client compliance. These positions ultimately
suggest that it may be unwise to rely much or at all on firms to
promote enforcing standards that increase uniformity or
comparability.
Third, the audit firms face conflicting interests and are
susceptible to activities that result in violation of securities laws,
including accounting and auditing standards. To the extent that their
power increases compared to smaller firms in a global IFRS
environment, the risks of this conflict-driven behavior may rise. The
more the largest firms provide the pivotal functions, the more they
will be subject to capture risks by clients. That risk rises as the firms
operate outside the supervisory jurisdiction of given national
enforcement authorities, and if there is no global enforcement
authority to police managers and companies, there is equally no
enforcement authority to police auditors.
Finally, audit firms cannot overcome contrary national pressure
to subordinate global accounting uniformity to national objectives.
Consider how Ernst & Young, pressured by China's four state banks,
in 2006 withdrew its report on the banks' non-performing loans.27 °
The firm estimated these to be $358 billion, while the official figure
put them at $133 billion. Similarly, PriceWaterhouseCoopers,
pressured by the Russian government, in 2007 withdrew audit reports
on Yukos, the oil group. 27' Auditing firms simply cannot contend
against such powerful national political pressure.
C.

Compliance Theory

Aside from production, interpretation, and enforcement of
international standards as a basis for promoting comparability,
attention is warranted to the fundamental issue of compliance. Many
people may voluntarily comply with a standard, even a new set of
accounting standards, without variation, by virtue either of
enforcement systems tailored to local conditions or compliance norms
that pervade a culture. These possibilities can be evaluated by
reference to the sizable body of literature addressing why people
comply with law, in general and in particular contexts, including
270. See Richard McGregor, E&Y Withdraws China NPL Report, FIN. TIMES, May 15,
2006, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/lle4d368-e3c7-llda-a015-0000779e2340.html
(last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
271. See Catherine Belton, PwC Withdraws Yukos Audits, FIN. TIMES, June 25, 2007,
at 19.
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The SEC pays essentially no attention to
financial reporting.
compliance matters aside from those embedded in its extensive
discussions of enforcement coordination strategies.
1. Calculation and Norms
Two broad theories contribute to explain compliance. One looks
to incentives and the other to norms. Gary Becker theorized
obedience in terms of positive law, depicting actors as rational wealth
maximizers who choose compliance or violation according to the
applicable cost-benefit calculation.272 Yet enforcement is costly, and
enforcement costs rise as willingness to comply declines. 3 Tom Tyler
offered instead a normative account through which compliance is
a
influenced by prevailing norms that guide behavior. Most likely,
2 74
combination of these features plays a role in differing contexts.
The Becker thesis relies heavily on the existence of credible
enforcement threats which, as discussed in the preceding Section, are
complex to calibrate for global accounting. Enforcement may be
uneven across countries with a variable cost-benefit calculus that
frustrates enforcement-induced compliance and hence comparability.
In addition, the incentives to comply or mis-report may vary across
Acutely, the
countries according to factors outlined earlier.
from firms, is
value
insiders
extract
phenomenon of tunneling, where
more prone to balance sheet manipulation in concentrated ownership
cultures and to income statement manipulation in dispersed
ownership cultures.275
In contrast, the Tyler thesis envisions voluntary compliance when
standards are fashioned in accordance with procedures that endow
them with a requisite degree of legitimacy. This hypothesis reinforces
the importance of the points previously discussed concerning IASB's
structure and production amid a muted role for national
IASB's structure and process must be seen,
interpretations.
universally, as legitimate. The degree of relinquishment of national
sovereignty must be seen as satisfying local legitimacy criteria.
272. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 201-27 (1986); Gary S.
Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 176-79
(1968); George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 J. POL. ECON. 526, 52729 (1970).
273. KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 72-73 (1974).
274. See generally TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAW (1990) (discussing

survey research that suggests that people comply with law because they perceive its moral
legitimacy, not so much from its deterrence threat); id. at 64 (suggesting that the primary
reason people comply with law is comportment with sense of right and wrong).
275. See supra text accompanying notes 187-89.
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2. Individuals and Firms
For individuals and firms, calculative and normative theories of
compliance suggest special problems for global accounting standards.
First, concerning calculative conceptions of compliance, the issue at
the individual level concerns assessing the relative costs and benefits
of decisions to comply or not. Costs are assumed to be a function of
the probability of detection and magnitude of sanctions.276 Benefits
are associated with direct payoffs from violations and/or differential
executive compensation levels.
Both can be complicated depending on factors such as last period
problems, which arise when a person is approaching retirement or
departure or a firm is approaching bankruptcy. Other incentives may
include meeting financial reporting targets, avoiding financial distress,
and protecting reputations.2 77
This summary suggests that the
variables, especially matters of compensation, meeting targets, and
enforcement risks, will require considerable tailoring in different
cultures to promote consistency and comparability at the
international level.278 Comparative research in securities regulation
supports this conclusion.279
Second, concerning normative conceptions of compliance, the
issue at the individual level hinges around a complex set of cultural
variables that, by definition, will vary across countries. Reputation is
one part of this constellation and generally plays a role only when
broader and deeper norms exist to promote a culture of
compliance.2 s°
These norms refer to spontaneously generated
standards of conduct, the departure from which is shameful.281
The norms are formed through a complex and innumerable
range of forces that include trust that arises when managers
276. See Jennifer H. Arlen & William J. Carney, Vicarious Liability for Fraud on

Securities Markets: Theory and Evidence, 1992 U. ILL. L. REV. 691, 701-03, 724-27 (1992).
277. See Cindy R. Alexander, On the Nature of the Reputational Penalty for Corporate
Crime: Evidence, 42 J.L. & ECON. 489, 489-92 (1999).

278. See Peng Sun & Yi Zhang, Is There Penalty for Crime: Corporate Scandal and
Management Turnover in China, (SSRN, Working Paper No. 891096, 2006), available at

http://ssrn.com/abstract=891096.
279. See Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary
ComparativeEvidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, 160-74 (2005); Utpal Bhattacharya &

Hazem Daouk, The World Priceof Insider Trading,57 J. FIN. 75, 81-84, 88-90 (2002).
280. See generally Mark C. Suchman, On Beyond Interest: Rational, Normative and
Cognitive Perspectives in the Social Scientific Study of Law, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 475

(discussing the intersection of reputation and other norms to create a culture of
compliance).
281. David A. Skeel, Jr., Shaming in CorporateLaw, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1811, 1820-23

(2001).
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appreciate that they are acting on behalf of others,282 guilt that
accompanies departures from conventional expectations,2 83 and
respect that responds to hortatory expressions in official legal
pronouncements.2& Although these components neither exhaust the
landscape nor command unanimous assent, they reflect the heavy
emphasis on the normative dimensions of corporate compliance. 85
This summary suggests several implications for corporate officials
acting in a global IFRS environment.
First, consider difference of scale. Norms induce compliance
more effectively in smaller communities than in larger ones. For
example, a coterie of directors of multinational U.S. corporations can
develop a shared sense of behavior that can establish the basis to
identify what constitutes shameful departures. 28 6 That is less likely to
occur on an international scale. The important influences are cultural
products, including notions of shame, guilt, trust, and reputation.
Recalling again the varying dimensions of corporate culture across
the world, competing conceptions of corporate purpose and
constituencies will influence norms.
Identical accounting decisions may be seen as shameful in some
locales and faithful in others. At polar extremes, contrast a vision
that embraces corporate social responsibility with one that
emphasizes short-term shareholder (and executive) wealth
maximization.287 Propensities to comply may also be influenced by
the source of a standard's authority, a variation on the theme of
perceived legitimacy. IASB standards may be perceived as bearing
282. Compare Margaret M. Blair & Lynn A. Stout, Trust, Trustworthiness and the
Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Law, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1735, 1796-97 (2001)

(discussing the formation of norms based on trust), with Lawrence E. Mitchell, Trust and
Team Production in Post-Capitalist Society, 24 IOWA J. CORP. L. 869, 889-97 (1999)
(commenting on earlier work by Professors Stout and Blair to provide insights on the

problems of norm compliance and calculation in the context of trust).
283. Melvin A. Eisenberg, CorporateLaw and Social Norms, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1253,
1259 (1999).
284. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware CorporateLaw Work?,
44 UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1011 (1997).
285. See Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Compliance with the Law in the Era of
Efficiency, 76 N.C. L. REV. 1265, 1370 n.395 (1998) (noting descriptive assumption of

rational choice accounts of law compliance is the cost-benefit calculus of rational actors
and is not supported by empirical research from Tyler and others). Rather, it shows a
more complex calculus including "a general sense of moral and civic obligation and of
fairness" and social relationships, peer judgments, and an internal sense of obligation
rooted in a sense of moral duty or recognition of lawmaking authorities as legitimate. Id.
286. Rock, supra note 284, at 1013-14.
287. Cynthia A. Williams, A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629,
1633 (2006).

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 87

legitimacy within one nation and bearing a degree of "foreignness"
that neutralizes compliance propensities in others.288
Additional factors that bear on probabilities of compliance
operate at the firm level. 89 Norms of compliance must contend with
other norms, some of which may point in opposite directions. A
firm's internal norms can trump broader social norms animating the
Competing norms
larger culture in which a firm operates.29
combined with strategic opportunities can reduce compliance even in
the face of a compliance norm, particularly when applicable
regulations are ambiguous.2 91 Internal controls may mitigate this
problem when designed to designate compliance exercises as routine
organizational matters. 92 Yet a movement from external control to
internal control can reduce legal risk and thus neutralize an important
compliance stimulus. 93 Nor can one count on audit firms to induce
the correct norms of compliance, given that those firms may suffer
from like challenges.2 94
None of this means that voluntary compliance is unlikely. It only
suggests that the capacity to predict it, and to design incentives and
mechanisms to promote it, will be knottier for global compliance with
IFRS than for domestic compliance with national accounting
standards. Again, the SEC offers no public analysis of these
challenges.
288. This hypothesis is reflected in the intense debates on the subject of using foreign
law in U.S. constitutional adjudication. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 586 (2003)
(Scalia, J. dissenting). Propensities may be hypothesized to decline along a continuum
from domestic criminal statutes, to foreign constitutional norms, to a principle of
international accounting.
289. See Jennifer Arlen & Reinier Kraakman, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An
Analysis of CorporateLiability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 687, 701-05 (1997) (focusing
on liability threats to induce preventive controls).
290. See Geraldine Szott Moohr, An Enron Lesson: The Modest Role of CriminalLaw
in Preventing CorporateCrime, 55 FLA. L. REV. 937, 956-73 (2003) (evaluating limitations
of economic and normative models of compliance, the former from behavioral limits on
calculability and the latter from competing social forces at sub-group levels such as
corporate culture).
291. See Timothy F. Malloy, Corporate Decision-making: Disclosure Stories, 32 FLA.
ST. U. L. Rev. 617, 642-50 (2005).
292. See Timothy F. Malloy, Regulation, Compliance and the Firm, 76 TEMP. L. REV.
451, 497-531 (2003) (conceiving regulatory compliance as another routine for an
organization pursued the way other routines are, to offer a more pragmatic and realistic
appraisal compared to either typical profit-maximizing and law-abiding images).
293. See Kenneth A. Bamberger, Regulation as Delegation: Private Firms,
Decisionmaking, and Accountability in the Administrative State, 56 DUKE L.J. 377, 385-408
(2006).
294. See Robert A. Prentice, The Case of the IrrationalAuditor: A Behavioral Insight
into Securities FraudLitigation, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 133, 181-86 (2000).
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3. Accounting's Expressive Function

Law can perform an expressive function of what norms are 295 by
both reflecting and changing them. 296 This function is one way that
law can influence behavior.297 Several conditions are necessary to
enable law to do so, because law can be ignored, circumvented, or
accompanied by dilutive exceptions.29 8 Vital to law's expressive
function is a sense that its production is legitimate and its acceptance
is, in some sense, voluntary. 29 9 But adopting laws with the intention
of using them for transformative purposes can backfire by provoking
backlash, as occurs with certain reforms designed to induce social
change.3" Subject to these difficulties, a modest consensus assumes
that law can perform this expressive function.
Can accounting do the same? A good case can be argued that
accounting does perform this function."' l The case is reinforced by
appreciating that, in many countries, and increasingly in the United
States, accounting is a formal or functional part of law.30 2 If so, can
accounting's expressive function be harnessed for the international
arena? This question is more daunting. The transplanting and
borrowing that may be an essential element of formulating IFRS,
evident in convergence projects, can prevent resulting standards from
performing an expressive function.3" 3 True, to the extent that
accounting expressions reflect shared aspirations and conjectures,
they may be capable of spawning informal norms that promote
comparability." 4 Yet, if accounting is to perform this expressive
295. See Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1399, 1426-31 (2005).
296. See Lawrence E. Mitchell, UnderstandingNorms, 49 U. TORONTO L.J. 177, 239-45
(1999) (drawing on Adam Smith's Theory of Moral Sentiments to demonstrate how law

can influence norms).
297. See Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U. PA. L. REV.
2021, 2051-53 (1996). See generally Bernard Black & Reneir Kraakman, A Self-Enforcing
Model of Corporate Law, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1911 (1996) (arguing that a "self-enforcing"

model is the best model of company law for companies in emerging economies).
298. See Katharina Pistor, The Standardization of Law and Its Effect on Developing
Economies, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 97, 112-14 (2002).
299. See TYLER, supra note 274, at 178.
300. See Linda Hamilton Kriege, Socio-Legal Backlash, 21 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB.
L. 476, 477-88, 492-93, 497-98 (2000).
301. See David I. Walker, FinancialAccounting and Corporate Behavior, 64 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 927 passim (2007).
302. See Thomas C. Pearson, Creating Accountability: Increased Legal Status of
Accounting and Auditing Authorities in the Global Capital Markets (U.S. and EU), 31 N.C.
J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 65, 142-43 (2005).
303. See Pistor, supra note 298.
304. Alice Belcher, Regulation by the Market: The Case of the Cadbury Code and
Compliance Statement, J. BUS. L. 321, 321-23, 326-29 (1995).
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function, cooperation is required among many nations whose support
is essential to communicate requisite legitimacy.
4. Nations
There is considerable scholarly disagreement concerning why
particular nations comply or refuse to comply with applicable
standards. Stances replicate those from debates in political theory.
As polar examples, these contest whether states are generally prone
to act according to the principles of realpolitik or according to
principles of mutual recognition and reciprocity." 5 Despite debate, it
seems safe to suppose that compliance propensities vary with subject
matter and context. It also seems safe to say that national compliance
propensities can be influenced by the form of ordainment the relevant
standard takes, whether by treaties, pacts, or international norms.
Where is accounting along the range of subject matters and
contexts that may induce stronger or weaker national compliance?
Accounting may not be as hotly or popularly contested a subject as
nuclear non-proliferation, climate change, or human rights. Yet
accounting standards can pose significant issues of national urgency
and interest, akin to trade agreements and other economic pacts. A
few highlights make the point.
Some E.U. member states are notorious for violating E.U.
directives on economic matters, including foreign takeovers of
domestic companies deemed to be national champions. Japan was a
notable hold-out in the process of generating and enforcing financial
accords reached in the Basel system," 6 and it refused to enforce its
own accounting standards in the late 1990s to avert a national
financial crisis.3" The United States did a similar thing when
Congress ousted FASB of jurisdiction to set oil and gas accounting
305. Other points of contention include whether to think of the relevant actors in a
disaggregated sense, applying traditional individual decision-making analysis to them, or
see the state as a unitary actor with an additional or different calculus. Competing views
between realists and legalists appreciate how states either can act solely in their own
national interests (realists) or seek to abide by adopted and prevailing international laws
and norms. Contemporary exemplars of positions within this vast scholarly literature
include the following: Harold Hongju Koh, Bringing InternationalLaw Home, 35 HOUS.
L. REV. 623 (1998) (evidencing how law influences norms in the context mainly of
promoting state compliance with international law); Eric A. Posner, InternationalLaw and
the Disaggregated State, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 797 (2005) (analyzing the role of profitmaking businesses in influencing state compliance with international law); Whitehead,
supra note 266 (attempting a more precise delineation of how norms translate through
individual actors into state decisions).
306. See Whitehead, supra note 266, at 720-35.
307. See supra text accompanying note 265.
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standards amid the 1970s energy crisis.3" 8 China and Russia, as noted,
compelled auditors to withdraw independent reports on financial
statements of important domestic enterprises.30 9 Propensities of noncompliance will likely be proportional to national contributions to
IASB's governance design and production. They may depend, in
part, on whether nations use a deference or endorsement approach to
accepting its products.310 On the other hand, it may not be necessary
that every nation always comply fully. It may be sufficient if a large
portion of nations, including the largest and most influential ones,
substantially comply with most of the standards most of the time.
Measured that way, there is reason for cautious optimism concerning
national propensities to comply.

The SEC addresses the need for consistent application in
practice, but it presents this issue by saying that "proper application
encompasses not only faithful adherence ... but also understandable
'
standards."3 11
It then admits, given its lack of experience with IFRS,
that it "would not have direct experience to assess the extent to which
IFRS would be properly applied by U.S. issuers."31 Instead, it says it
would make judgments based on whether the requisite infrastructure
was in place in the United States.3" 3 This speaks to the point that
compliance propensities depend on the surrounding cultural and
infrastructural context. Yet it must be noted that what works in one
country, including the United States, will not necessarily work in
others. As with so many of the daunting challenges facing its global
accounting vision, the SEC has not publicly reflected on these
challenges.
CONCLUSION

The SEC's global accounting vision appears to be quixotic. This
idealistic and impractical view may be due to the vision's emergence
from a combination of political pressure and idiosyncratic ambition,
and its public materials scratch the surface of the many challenges to
be faced domestically and internationally.
A dose of realism
308.
309.
310.
311.
entitled
312.
313.

See supra note 248.
See supra text accompanying notes 269-70.
See Pistor, supra note 298, at 101-02.
SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note 1, at 45,607-08 (section
Application in Practice).
Id.
Id.
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underscores how daunting these challenges are. On the other hand,
the proliferation and pressure of global capitalism induces the drive
toward universal accounting standards, and it can be difficult for any
centralized authority to control that journey.
It may be possible to bridge diversity using a universal set of
accounting standards that concentrates on points of congruence while
appreciating the consequences of difference. After all, inchoate but
real convergence is occurring in important aspects of modern culture.
These aspects include melding of legal traditions, coalescing around
some forms of capitalism, and expanding global coordination and
governance in many spheres of human activity. Yet diversity endures
in many of those spheres, including those that affect accounting,
especially law, economics, politics, and language.
Other cultural phenomena have proven more or less susceptible
to such transcendence. Consider the metric system-a standardized,
uniform method of measurement. This innovation was important to
expanding international trade. It was begun by France in the late
eighteenth century and was gradually adopted by all countries except
the United States and two smaller ones.314 Even in the United States,
however, people are familiar with the metric system, and its use is
widespread in everything from consumer goods to industrial
production. Although accounting is more complex and involves more
than just measurement, measurement is an important aspect of
accounting.
Accounting's more complex attributes explain the hackneyed
adage that accounting is the language of business. This is a half-truth.
Accounting is a means of communication and has that in common
with natural languages. It also is a system of measurement, as noted,
plus a system of recordkeeping, aggregation, and classification. Of
course, thousands of languages exist in the world, and hundreds are in
use in the United States alone. Still, English has emerged as a widelyspoken, nearly-universal language, at least among active participants
in international matters. On the other hand, conscious efforts to
create a universal language have failed. The infamous example is
Esperanto. This was a high quality language, grammatically sound
and coherent, with a sizable vocabulary capable of extensive
expression."' Yet it never caught on and is not widely used
anywhere.
314. See MetricConversion.us, The Metric System, http://www.metricconversion.us/
system.htm (last visited Nov. 21, 2008).
315. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
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International coordination is required to guide IFRS to a fate
similar to the metric system rather than Esperanto. This concept
invites noting a third potential parallel, the adoption of the euro by a
dozen European states in 1999. For centuries, these countries, which
include France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, and Spain, used
separate currencies. These currencies were fundamental expressions
and devices of sovereignty as well as important cultural symbols.
National relinquishment of currencies in favor of a common one was
a bold and daring experiment that succeeded. This feat provides a
basis for optimism about IFRS. True, the number of countries
involved with IFRS is much larger, but the sacrifice in national
sovereignty is slight in comparison.
Establishing IASB resembles the quest for facilitating
international arrangements akin to the institutions led by the United
States during preceding generations, especially the United Nations,
the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World
Trade Organization.3 16 These institutions, which are thoroughly
capitalistic, created financial relationships among the most influential
countries, and these relationships increased economic interdependency. They established norms for how countries should relate
to one another, with salubrious effects like reducing propensities to
resolve disputes by armed conflict and increasing global economic
growth.
It is not surprising that many proponents of global
accounting cite promoting world economic growth.
Max Weber explained how capital accounting was a precondition to the flourishing of capitalism.3 17 Likewise, a global
financial reporting system is a pre-condition to real flourishing of
globalization." 8 Earlier, capital accounting offered participants the
capacity for rational calculation, in terms of money, in an evolving
economy that reflected inchoate systems of democracy and helped to
spread them, along with capitalism, to replace tribalism,
fundamentalism, and theocracy. As Weber also observed, rational
calculations of the capitalist can lead to overlooking social needs or
316. Press Release, International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, IASB
Tops Global Rankings for Stakeholder Participation; Identified as "Higher Performer" for
Transparency and Evaluation (Dec. 2, 2007), available at http://www.iasb.org/
NR/rdonlyres/96117DC3-C20C-4D42-B352-125119324CDD/0/Oneworldtrustfinal_3_.pdf
(reporting publication of One World Trust's rankings of "world's most powerful global
organisations").
317. See WEBER, supra note 2.
318. See generally Bernard S. Black, The Legal and Institutional Preconditions for
Strong Securities Markets, 48 UCLA L. REV. 781 (2001) (arguing that accounting is a
precondition to strong securities markets).
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interests that arise in spheres that are not susceptible to its
benevolence.31 9 Weber's distinction between formal rationality of

economic action and substantive rationality warrants continued
attention in the journey toward global capitalism.32 °

His insight

requires appreciating the different forms of capitalism and the
different conceptions of corporate purpose and constituencies
discussed in this Article.

Criticism of the SEC aside, perhaps an elaborate, informed,
reflective plan or policy statement infused with realism would bear
little fruit. Maybe the expedient path is just the one the SEC takes,
laying out simple visions in two releases followed by some
roundtables and final rule adoptions.

However, the SEC's actual

products make it hard to believe that its strategy was thought out in
these terms either. More likely, the SEC, responding to political
pressures, drawing on decades of institutional commitment, and
seizing political opportunities, opted to lurch forward. Its lip service

to investor protection notwithstanding, the SEC must be aware that
its quest has at least as much to do with the proliferation of capitalism
as with investor interests.32' But forces driving the quest for global
accounting can exhibit evolutionary qualities beyond its capacity to
control.322
Even so, the SEC cannot escape the foregoing criticism, some of
which may be harsh but is supported by the record. Fortunately, it is
not too late to redress the oversights.3 23 The most important concrete
319. See WEBER, supra note 2.
320. Id. Weber explained that formal rationality of economic action is the extent of
rational calculation or accounting possible and applied (and are calculable and definite);
substantive rationality is the degree that provisioning is shaped by economically-oriented
social action under some criterion of ultimate values (which are ambiguous because they
depend on ethical and political matters hinging on varying philosophies, such as utilitarian,
hedonistic, feudal, or egalitarian, and all have at their core varying conceptions of social
justice and equality).
321. See generally SEC Final Rule Rescinding Reconciliation, supra note 75 (in
providing required securities law discussion of impact on the economy, competition,
efficiency and capital formation, the SEC emphasizes the benefits of rescinding the
reconciliation requirement as promoting capital formation, increasing efficiency,
competition, and capital formation); SEC Concept Release on Domestic IFRS, supra note
1, at 45,604 ("Key forces favoring a single set of globally accepted accounting standards
include, but are not limited to, the continued expansion of the capital markets across
national borders, and the desire by countries to achieve strong, stable and liquid capital
markets to fuel economic growth.").
322. See Sudipta Basu & Gregory B. Waymire, Recordkeeping and Human Evolution,
20 ACCT. HORIZONs 201, 211-12 (2006).

323. There is little question that the SEC's recent proposals concerning IFRS (both
rescinding reconciliation and contemplating letting U.S. issuers use either) were produced
hastily and show weaknesses that are inconsistent with the SEC's traditional professional
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step is for the SEC to provide public evaluation of the challenges
identified in this Article to which it has currently given scant or no
attention.
This could be accomplished through the widely
recommended procedure to develop a medium-term plan to move all
U.S. issuers to IFRS within a decade. That movement would not
avoid the need to confront challenges, but it would enable a
coordinated effort among participants to resolve them and accept the
costs that must be borne to obtain expected benefits. It is as
important for the SEC to concentrate on the needs of U.S. investors,
which it has not done, as it is to expand global capitalism by focusing
on the needs of companies to form capital and facilitate capital
formation and flows.

standards. A slapdash character plagues similar documents and actions used by the SEC's
peer institutions globally amid the spell of principles-based rhetoric and rush to IFRS.
The common flaws do not excuse the SEC's departure from traditional standards of
excellence.
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